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I. Introduction
Equity has long held, subject to limited exceptions, that non-charitable purpose trusts are not legally valid trusts. While a provision in 
Canadian wait-and-see perpetuities legislation1 provides that trusts for 
specific non-charitable purposes are valid trusts, it provides for their 
enforcement only as a power (i.e. the trustee may carry out the terms 
of the non-charitable purpose trust but is not legally obliged to do so). 
The Uniform Trustee Act (2012) 2 (“Uniform Trustee Act”) proposed by 
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 2012 contains a provision 
1. Wait-and-see perpetuity legislation modifies the common law rules 
against perpetuities. Many common law jurisdictions have enacted such 
legislation including the provinces of Alberta (Perpetuities Act, RSA 2000, 
c P-5 [Alberta Perpetuities Act]); British Columbia (Perpetuity Act, RSBC 
1996, c 358 [BC Perpetuity Act]); Ontario (Perpetuities Act, RSO 1990, 
c P.9 [Ontario Perpetuities Act]); Yukon Territories (Perpetuities Act, RSY 
2002, c 168 [Yukon Perpetuities Act]); Northwest Territories (Perpetuities 
Act, RSNWT 1988, c P-3 [NWT Perpetuities Act]); and Nunavut 
(Perpetuities Act, RSNWT 1988, c P-3 (as duplicated for Nunavut by s 
29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28) as amended by the Miscellaneous 
Statutes Amendment Act, S Nu 2010, c 4, s 25 [Nunavut Perpetuities Act]). 
See infra notes 34-36 and the accompanying text.
2. Uniform Trustee Act (2012) adopted by the Uniform Law Conference 
of Canada, online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada <www.ulcc.ca> 
[Uniform Trustee Act].
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for the enforcement of certain non-charitable purpose trusts as trusts 
(i.e. as legally enforceable obligations). This paper draws on this Uniform 
Trustee Act concept, but recommends expanding the range of potential 
enforcement for all types of express trusts whether they are for non-
charitable purposes, charitable purposes or for persons. In particular, it 
recommends that, for all types of express trusts, settlors be allowed to 
indicate possible enforcers and courts be allowed to grant standing to 
persons to enforce, subject to the settlor indicating otherwise and subject 
to controls against vexatious actions or actions that would not be in the 
best interests of the trust. 
Following a suggestion in the Uniform Trustee Act which allows for 
Crown enforcement of certain non-charitable purpose trusts, this paper 
recommends allowing for Crown enforcement of all types of express trusts 
(not just charitable purpose trusts) in statutorily specified situations. It is 
also argued that with Crown enforcement of all types of express trusts in 
statutorily specified situations, it is no longer necessary to retain several 
of the distinct features of charitable purpose trusts, such as exclusivity, 
public benefit and the invalidity of political purpose trusts. If the rule 
against perpetuities is abrogated, as it now has been in three provinces, 
there would also be no need for the perpetuity exception for charitable 
purpose trusts. If, however, the rule against perpetuities is retained, it 
is recommended that the perpetuity exception for charitable purpose 
trusts be extended to statutorily-identified non-charitable purpose trusts. 
In either case, the availability of cy-près orders should be extended to 
statutorily-identified non-charitable purpose trusts. In addition, it is 
suggested that the availability of court ordered administrative schemes be 
extended to statutorily-identified non-charitable purpose trusts.
In short, this paper recommends making quite drastic changes to 
trust law developments dating back hundreds of years. The path to the 
arguments for such significant changes begins, in Part II, with some 
background on the distinction between express trusts for persons, non-
charitable purpose trusts and charitable purpose trusts. Part III indicates 
how express trusts for persons, sometimes referred to as “private trusts”, 
can provide benefits to a community broader than persons with a close 
connection to the settlor and may do so in a way that might be considered 
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socially beneficial or fall into traditional legal concepts of charitable 
purposes. It also indicates that non-charitable purpose trusts may have 
purposes that, while not fitting the legal definition of charitable purpose, 
may nonetheless provide societal benefits. Part IV focuses on enforcement 
issues, noting that problems of weak enforcement, while perhaps not as 
severe as for non-charitable purpose trusts, can nonetheless also occur in 
express trusts for persons and charitable purpose trusts. Part V notes the 
Uniform Trustee Act provision for enforcement of non-charitable purpose 
trusts and recommends extending the concept of settlor designated 
enforcers to express trusts for persons and charitable purpose trusts. Part 
VI recommends allowing the court to grant standing to persons to enforce 
all types of express trusts subject to the settlor indicating otherwise and 
subject to controls against vexatious actions or actions that would not 
be in the best interests of the trust. Part VII then suggests providing for 
Crown enforcement of all types of express trusts that have aspects that 
justify expenditure of public funds on enforcement determined according 
to statutorily provided circumstances for Crown enforcement. With the 
recommended common approach to the enforcement of express trusts, 
Part VIII goes on to suggest the elimination of other distinguishing 
features of charitable purpose trusts such as exclusivity, public benefit, 
the political purposes doctrine and perpetuities.
II. Relevant Trust Law Background
Some aspects of trust law that provide helpful background to the 
discussion that follows are briefly reviewed here. Subpart A, below, sets 
out a typology of trusts to highlight the focus of the paper on express 
trusts. It also identifies a common division of express trusts into trusts 
for persons and trusts for purposes and briefly notes the distinction 
between charitable and non-charitable purposes. Subpart B discusses the 
general invalidity of non-charitable purpose trusts with emphasis on the 
enforcement concern asserted to be the main reason for general invalidity. 
It then briefly notes judicial and statutory exceptions that have been made 
to general invalidity. Subpart C notes the validity of charitable purpose 
trusts and how the purpose trust enforcement concern is addressed for 
charitable purpose trusts. It also notes the requirement that charitable 
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purpose trusts be for exclusively charitable purposes and the enforcement 
concern that has been given as the reason for that requirement.
A. A Typology of Trusts: Express Trusts, Trusts by 
Operation of Law, and Statutory Trusts
A common typology of trusts distinguishes between express trusts 
and trusts by operation of law.3 Express trusts are trusts that a person 
(or persons) intends to create.4 The intention may have been clearly 
expressed in words the person used or, where the words are less clear, may 
be implied from words used, the conduct of the person or the particular 
circumstances in which the person used the words or engaged in the 
conduct.5 Trusts by operation of law include constructive trusts and, in 
3. See e.g. John Mowbray et al, Lewin on Trusts, 18d (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008) at 23; David Hayton & Paul Matthews, Underhill and 
Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 18d (London: LexisNexis, 
2010) at 79-86; Geraint Thomas & Alastair Hudson, The Law of Trusts, 
2d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 19-21; Jill E Martin & 
Harold G Hanbury, Modern Equity, 19d (London: Thomson, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012) at 71-74; John McGhee, ed, Snell’s Equity, 32d (London: 
Thomson, 2010) at 630; Eileen E Gillese, The Law of Trusts, 3d (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2014) at 39, 105; and Albert H Oosterhoff, Robert Chambers 
& Mitchell McInnes, Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and 
Materials, 8d (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 24-28.
4. See e.g. Mowbray, supra note 3 at 23; Hayton & Matthews, supra note 
3 at 79-80; Thomas & Hudson, supra note 3 at 19; Martin & Hanbury, 
supra note 3 at 71; McGhee, supra note 3 at 630; Gillese, supra note 3 at 
39; Oosterhoff, Chambers & McInnes, supra note 3 at 24; and Philip H 
Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 11d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) at 67.
5. See e.g. Mowbray, supra note 3 at 23; Hayton & Matthews, supra note 3 
at 80; Pettit, supra note 4 at 67; Thomas & Hudson, supra note 3 at 19-
20; and McGhee, supra note 3 at 630.
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the typology of some, may include resulting trusts.6 Statutes often create 
trusts that can have unique aspects deriving explicitly or implicitly from 
the particular statute.7 The focus in this paper is on express trusts.
Express trusts have been divided into trusts for persons and trusts for 
purposes. Trusts for persons provide benefits for persons who are called 
“beneficiaries”. For example, a parent with two minor children, Nancy 
and Dave, and not expecting to have any more children, might provide 
in a will that the residue of her or his estate be held in trust and invested, 
with the investment income to be used to provide for Nancy and Dave 
6. Donovan WM Waters, Mark R Gillen & Lionel D Smith, Waters’ Law of 
Trusts in Canada, 4d (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) notes that  
“[a]n express trust arises out of the intention of the settlor; a constructive 
trust comes into existence, regardless of any party’s intent, when the law 
imposes upon a party an obligation to specific property for the benefit 
of another” at 478. It also notes at 394, citing Pecore v Pecore, 2007 SCC 
17, that “[b]roadly speaking, a resulting trust arises whenever legal or 
equitable title to property is in one party’s name, but that party is under 
an obligation to return it to the original title owner, or to the person 
who paid the purchase money for it” at para 20. Oosterhoff, Chambers 
& McInnes, supra note 3, says that “[a] constructive trust … defies 
simple description. Whereas an express trust is defined by its origins in 
the settlor’s intention and a resulting trust is defined by its operation in 
reversing a transfer, a constructive trust is simply a trust that equity has 
‘constructed’ for some good reason” at 709. In Waters, Gillen & Smith at 
394-97, 478 different uses of the term “implied trust,” “resulting trust” 
and “constructive trust” are discussed. While some treat the resulting trust 
as arising by operation of law, others treat it as an express trust arising 
out of implied intention (see e.g. Peter D Maddaugh & John McCamus, 
The Law of Restitution (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2014) (loose-leaf 
5:200), at 5-6, nn 22a, 23, and the accompanying text; and A J Oakley, 
Constructive Trusts, 2d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at 14-18).
7. There are many statutory trusts. Examples include trusts of the property 
of bankrupts under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3; 
builders’ lien trusts such as under the Builders Lien Act, SBC 1997, c 45, 
s 10; or trusts for purposes such as habitat conservation an example of 
which is the Habitat Conservation Trust Fund under the Wildlife Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 488, as amended by SBC 2007, c 24, ss 51-52.
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during their minority.8 Nancy and Dave would both be beneficiaries 
specifically named in the trust. A trust for persons can also describe a 
class of persons. A grandparent might, for example, during her or his 
life, transfer money to a person to hold in trust and invest the money, 
accumulating the income and making distributions to provide for the 
post-secondary education of her or his grandchildren. The described class 
of persons would be the “grandchildren” of the grandparent and could 
include as yet unborn grandchildren.9 The object of a trust for purposes 
differs in that it is not directed to specific persons or to a defined class of 
persons, but to the pursuit of one or more specific purposes. A person 
might, for example, provide in her or his will that some specified amount 
of money out of the person’s estate be set aside for the erection of a 
monument at the person’s grave site.
Trusts for purposes are typically divided into two types: charitable 
purpose trusts and non-charitable purpose trusts. A legally valid 
charitable purpose trust requires that the purpose(s) of the trust: (i) be 
charitable purposes; (ii) be exclusively charitable; and (iii) provide a 
“public benefit”.10 The meaning of “charitable purpose” is based on the 
8. The trust could go on to provide that when Nancy and Dave reach the age 
of majority any remaining funds be, among numerous other possibilities, 
distributed equally between Nancy and Dave, distributed to some named 
person other than Nancy or Dave or returned to the settlor. If nothing is 
said about the distribution of any remaining funds, they would go to the 
settlor (or the settlor’s estate) on a resulting trust.
9. If the applicable jurisdiction of the trust continued to have the common 
law rule against perpetuities (or a modified version thereof ), care would 
need to be taken to ensure that the potential gift to unborn grandchildren 
does not vest outside the perpetuity period. The description of a class 
of beneficiaries needs to meet the test of certainty of beneficiaries. In 
McPhail v Doulton (1970), [1971] AC 424 (HL), it was held that the test 
of certainty of beneficiaries for a discretionary trust is “that the trust is 
valid if it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a 
member of the class” at 16 [McPhail].
10. The “charitable” requirement is discussed here in this Part II.A. The 
exclusivity requirement is discussed further in Part II.C.2 below and the 
public benefit requirement is discussed further in Part III.C below.
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preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.11 The preamble listed 
examples of charitable purposes to which funds had been provided at 
that time. In Morice v The Bishop of Durham12 it was held that charitable 
purpose had a restricted meaning. For it to be a charitable purpose it 
had to be mentioned in the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses or 
11. 43 Eliz I, c 4. That was a statute that provided a mechanism for 
the enforcement of purpose trusts through publicly appointed 
“commissioners”. The preamble to the statute said:
 “WHEREAS Landes Tenements Rentes Annuities Profittes Hereditamentes, 
Goodes Chattels Money and Stockes of Money, have bene heretofore 
given limitted appointed and assigned, as well by the Queenes moste 
excellent Majestie and her moste noble Progenitors, as by sondrie other 
well disposed persons, some for Reliefe of aged impotent and poore people, 
some for Maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and Marriners, 
Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities, some 
for Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and 
Highewaies, some for Educacion and prefermente of Orphans, some for or 
towardes Reliefe Stocke or Maintenance for Howses for Correccion, some 
for Mariages of poore Maides, some for Supportacion Ayde and Helpe of 
younge Tradesmen, Handiecraftesmen and persons decayed, and others 
for reliefe or redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of 
any poore Inhabitants concerninge paymente of Fifteenes, settinge out of 
Souldiers and other Taxes, Whiche Landes Tenements Rents Annuities 
Profitts Hereditaments Goodes Chattells Money and Stockes of Money 
nevertheless have not byn imployed accordinge to the charitable intente of 
the givers and founders thereof, by reason of Fraudes breaches of Truste and 
Negligence in those that shoulde pay delyver and imploy the same … ”.
12. (1804), 32 ER 656 (Ch) [Morice Ch]; (1805), 32 ER 947 (Ch) [Morice 
Ch D].
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be analogous to a purpose mentioned therein.13 In the 1891 House of 
Lords decision in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v 
Pemsel 14 (“Pemsel ”) Lord McNaughten said the charitable purposes in the 
preamble fell into four categories:15
i. the relief of poverty;
ii. the advancement of education;
iii. the advancement of religion; and
iv. other purposes beneficial to the community.
The categorization in Pemsel has been accepted by the Supreme Court of 
13. In the words of Master of the Rolls Grant in Morice Ch, supra note 12 
(what is a charitable purpose, “is derived chiefly from the Statute of 
Elizabeth (stat. 43 Eliz. c. 4). Those purposes are considered charitable, 
which that Statute enumerates, or which by analogies are deemed within 
its spirit and intendment” at 659). In upholding the decree of Grant MR, 
Lord Eldon in Morice Ch D, supra note 12 noted that the duty of trustees 
of a disposition to charity is “to apply the money to charity, in the sense, 
which the determinations have affixed to that word in this Court: viz. 
either such charitable purposes as are expressed in the Statute (stat. 43 
Eliz. c. 4), or to purposes having analogy to those. I believe the expression 
‘charitable purposes,’ as used in this Court, has been applied to many Acts 
described in that Statute and analogous to those, not because they can 
with propriety be called charitable, but as that denomination is by the 
Statute given to all the purposes described” at 954.
14. [1891] AC 531 (HL) [Pemsel].
15. at 538. This categorization, or something close to it, appears to have 
been contemplated much earlier given the following comment by Mr. 
Romilly for the petitioners in Morice Ch D, supra note 12 (“There are four 
objects, within one of which all charity, to be administered in the Court, 
must fall: 1st, relief of the indigent; in various ways: money: provisions: 
education: medical assistance; &c.: 2dly, the advancement of learning: 
3dly, the advancement of religion: 4thly, which is the most difficult, the 
advancement of objects of general public utility” at 951).
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Canada.16 The fourth category appears on its face to say that all one needs 
to show to establish a charitable purpose is that the purpose is beneficial 
to the community. This, however, is not the approach courts, including 
courts in Canada, have taken. The majority decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority 
Women v MNR17 noted that it is not enough to find that a purpose is 
beneficial to the community to make it charitable. The benefit must also 
be one that the law regards as charitable.18 The majority said the way to 
determine whether a purpose is charitable is to look to the preamble to 
the Statute of Charitable Uses, to analogies to the preamble and then to 
analogies upon analogies found in previous cases.19
B. Invalidity of Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
Trusts for non-charitable purposes have traditionally been held not to 
be legally valid trusts.20 The idea behind a legally valid trust, whether 
a trust for persons or a trust for purposes, is that the court will enforce 
the obligation undertaken by the trustee. The main reason given for the 
non-validity of non-charitable purpose trusts is that, without named 
beneficiaries or a defined class of beneficiaries, there is no one to enforce 
16. See e.g. AYSA Amateur Youth Soccer Assn v Canada (Revenue Agency), 
2007 SCC 42 at 233 [AYSA]; Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible 
Minority Women v MNR, [1999] 1 SCR 10 at paras 40-41, 102-103 
[Vancouver Society]; Guaranty Trust Company of Canada v Minister of 
National Revenue, [1967] SCR 133 at 141 [Guaranty Trust]; and The King 
v Assessors of Sunny Brae (Town), [1952] 2 SCR 76. 
17. See Vancouver Society, supra note 16.
18. See the majority decision in Vancouver Society, supra note 16 at paras 148, 
176. The same point is made in the minority judgment at paras 43-49.
19. See the majority decision of Vancouver Society, supra note 16 at paras 
148, 176-79, 200-203. The minority, after discussing several cases and 
the approach to the fourth head of charitable purposes, also concluded 
that (“courts should consider whether the purpose under consideration 
is analogous to one of the purposes enumerated in the preamble of the 
Statute of Elizabeth, or build analogy upon analogy” at 49-51). This 
approach to charitable purposes under the fourth head was confirmed 
more recently in AYSA, supra note 16 at paras 27-28, 31.
20. See the cases cited infra note 31.
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the trust by seeking a court order to hold the trustee to obligations he or 
she has undertaken.21 The phrase often noted in the context of the reason 
for non-enforcement of purpose trusts is that of Master of the Rolls 
Grant who, in the 1804 decision of Morice v The Bishop of Durham,22 said 
that there needs to be someone “in whose favour the court can decree 
performance”.23
Over the course of the 19th century some limited exceptions were 
made to the general rule of non-validity of non-charitable purpose 
trusts.24 These were for:
i. the maintenance of a gravesite;25
ii. the erection of a monument at a gravesite;26 and
iii. the provision of food and shelter for specified animals.27
Another possible exception was where there was a gift over to some 
21. See e.g. James R Phillips, “Purpose Trusts” in Mark R Gillen & Faye 
Woodman, eds, The Law of Trusts: A Contextual Approach 3d (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2015) 165 at 166. See also Donovan WM Waters, 
“Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts in Common Law Canada” (2008) 28 
Estates Trusts & Pensions Journal 16 at 18-19.
22. Morice Ch, supra note 12 (The purported trust was for “such objects of 
benevolence and liberality as the trustee [the Bishop of Durham] in his 
own discretion shall most approve” at 656). Master of the Rolls Grant’s 
decree that the trust was invalid was upheld on appeal by Lord Eldon (see 
Morice Ch D, supra note 12).
23. Morice Ch, supra note 12 at 658. Master of the Rolls Grant’s decision was 
upheld by Lord Eldon on appeal – see Morice Ch D, supra note 12.
24. While these exceptions allow the trust to be valid so the funds directed 
to such purposes do not revert to the estate of the deceased, the trust 
is, practically speaking, only enforced as a power since the fundamental 
problem remains that there is no one to enforce the trust.
25. See Trimmer v Danby (1856), 25 LJ Ch 424 (Eng); Pirbright v Salwey, 
[1896] WN 86 (Ch (Eng)); Re Hooper, [1932] 1 Ch 38 (Eng). This was 
accepted in Canada in Crocker v Senior (1971), 2 Nfld & PEIR 179 
(SCTD). 
26. Ibid. A different position was, however, taken in the Canadian case of Re 
Jefferson Estate, [1929] 3 WWR 690 (Man KB).
27. Pettingall v Pettingall (1842), 11 LJ Ch 176 (Eng); Mitford v Reynolds 
(1848), 60 ER 812 (Ch).
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person after a period, complying with the rule against perpetuities, 
during which the trust for the purpose could operate.28 The exceptions 
led to the argument in Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts29 that these exceptions 
meant there was no general rule against the non-validity of non-charitable 
purpose trusts.30 It was, however, held that there was a general rule of 
non-validity and that the list of exceptions should be considered closed.31
The possible exception where there was a gift over to some person after 
a period for the operation of the trust provided a means of enforcement 
of the purpose trust. The person to whom there was a gift over at the 
end of the period would have an incentive to monitor the trustee and, 
if warranted, pursue a breach of trust action if the trustee expended the 
28. See Re Thompson, [1934] Ch 342 (Eng) [Re Thompson] commented on in 
Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts, [1952] Ch 534 (Eng) [Re Astor’s]. Re Thompson 
involved a trust for the purpose of furthering fox-hunting leaving the 
residue after a specified period to Trinity College of Cambridge University. 
The purpose trust was held to be valid since the purpose was found to 
be reasonably certain and since Trinity College of Cambridge University 
could enforce the trust if the funds were misapplied. Pettit, supra note 4 
at 60-61, suggests that there may also be an exception for trusts for the 
saying of masses if they are not found to be for charitable purposes (saying 
of masses in public have been found to be for charitable purposes) and are 
restricted to the perpetuity period citing Bourne v Keane, [1919] AC 815 
(HL).
29. Re Astor’s, ibid.
30. See the arguments of Gray QC and Wilfred M Hunt in Re Astor’s, ibid at 
539 and Justice Roxburgh’s summary of their argument at 541. 
31. Re Astor’s, ibid at 547; Leahy v Attorney General of New South Wales, [1959] 
2 All ER 300 (PC (Austl)); and Re Endacott, [1960] Ch 232 (CA) (LJ 
Harmon at 250-51, and Lord Evershed, at 247) [Re Endacott]. In Canada 
see e.g. Wood v R (1977), 1 ETR 285 (Alta SC (TD)) at paras 18-19 [Re 
Russell]; Rowland v Vancouver College Ltd, (2000), 78 BCLR (3d) 87 (SC) 
at paras 68-73; (aff’d on appeal (2001), 94 BCLR (3d) 249 (CA) but 
the non-charitable purpose trust question was not discussed); Dionisio v 
Mancinelli (2004), 12 ETR (3d) 296 (Ont Sup Ct J); and Keewatin Tribal 
Council Inc v City of Thompson (1989), 61 Man R (2d) 241 (QB) at para 
69 [Keewatin]. Re Astor’s, supra note 28, and Re Endacott were considered 
in Canada in Re Lerner and Society for Crippled Children & Adults of 
Manitoba, [1979] 3 ACWS 442 (Man QB).
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trust funds in a way that was not consistent with the purpose of the trust. 
This, it has been pointed out, provides only “negative enforcement” since 
the person to whom there was a gift over at the end of the period would 
not have an incentive to ensure the trustee actually used trust funds to 
pursue the intended purpose.32 Indeed, the person to whom there was a 
gift over at the end of the period would be better off if the trustee never 
expended any of the trust funds on the intended purpose. This would 
effectively make the trust operate as a power since it would be unlikely 
that any action would be taken against the trustee for not expending 
funds for the purpose, although the trustee could expend the funds for 
the purpose if the trustee so chose.33
Wait-and-see perpetuities legislation often contains a provision for 
the validity of non-charitable purpose trusts along similar lines to the 
possible exception of a purpose trust for a period with a gift over at the 
end of the period.34 The typical provision provides that where there is 
a trust for a specific non-charitable purpose that creates no enforceable 
equitable interest in a specific person, the “trust” is valid but is to be 
construed as a power and can operate as such for a maximum period 
32. See e.g. Oosterhoff, Chambers & McInnes, supra note 3 at 545.
33. On the effect of enforcing a purpose trust where there is a gift over of the 
residue as being similar to a power see e.g. James E Penner, The Law of 
Trusts, 7d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 248.
34. See e.g. Alberta Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 20; BC Perpetuity Act, 
supra note 1, s 24; NWT Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 17; Nunavut 
Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 25; Ontario Perpetuities Act, supra note 
1, s 16; Yukon Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 20. See also American 
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 3d (St. Paul: American 
Law Institute Publishers, 1992) at 47; and prior to that American Law 
Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 2d (Washington, DC: American 
Law Institute Publishers, 1957) at 124. See also the United States of 
America’s Uniform Trust Code § 409 (2010); and see e.g. California Probate 
Code § 15211. 
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of up to twenty-one years.35 At the end of the period during which the 
purpose is to operate, subject to a maximum of twenty-one years, the 
capital and unexpended income is to go to the person who would have 
been entitled to the property at the end of twenty-one years.36
The general rule of non-validity of non-charitable purpose trusts 
does not apply if the trust, although expressed as being for a purpose, 
can be construed as being a trust for persons, since there are then persons 
in whose favour the court can decree performance — i.e. persons who 
could enforce the trust. A common example is a trust “for the education 
of my children” that, while expressed to be for the purpose of educating 
35. See e.g. Alberta Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 20(1); BC Perpetuity Act, 
supra note 1, ss 24(1)-(3); Ontario Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 16(1). 
Two of the questions that arise in the interpretation of this legislation are: 
(i) when does the provision apply; and (ii) what is the meaning of the 
phrase “a specific non-charitable purpose trust”. As to the first question, 
one might argue that since this purpose trust provision appeared in 
legislation modifying the common law rule against perpetuities, it would 
only apply if the particular trust violated the common law rule (i.e. if 
the purpose trust was for a perpetual duration). In Re Russell, supra note 
31, the court held a non-charitable purpose trust to be valid applying 
the provision in the Alberta wait-and-see perpetuities legislation (The 
Perpetuities Act, SA 1972, c 121, s 20, now Perpetuities Act, RSA 2000, c 
P-5, s 20) even though the purported trust did not violate the common 
law perpetuity rule. As to the second question, the court in Re Russell, 
supra note 31, applied the test in McPhail, supra note 9 at 28 (modifying 
it to purpose trusts so that there is “a specific non-charitable purpose” if 
one can say whether any given use of the trust funds would qualify as a 
proper use).
36. See e.g. Alberta Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 20(2); BC Perpetuity Act, 
supra note 1, s 24(4); Ontario Perpetuities Act, supra note 1, s 16(2). If, for 
example, there was a gift in a will to a person who was to use the property 
for a specific non-charitable purpose, that gift could take effect. It would 
not revert to the estate on the basis that the purported trust was an invalid 
non-charitable purpose trust.
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the children, can be read as “to my children for their education”.37 In 
this example, whichever of the two wordings are used, the beneficiaries 
are the children and the problem of there being no one “in whose favour 
the court can decree performance” does not arise.38 Re Denley’s Trusts39 
(“Re Denley’s”) took this approach to finding a trust expressed ostensibly 
as for a purpose to be a valid trust. Land was given to trustees to create 
a recreational or sports ground for the benefit of the employees of a 
particular company.40 While the trust was expressed as being for the 
purpose of creating a recreation or sports ground, it was clear that the 
beneficiaries were the employees. The court could decree performance 
in favour of the employees as beneficiaries — i.e. there were beneficiaries 
who could enforce the trust. Justice Goff held the trust to be a valid 
trust saying, “[w]here, then, the trust, though expressed as a purpose, 
37. See e.g. Phillips, supra note 21 at 171; and Gillese, supra note 3 at 59. A 
case involving a trust remarkably similar to this example is Sacks v Gridiger 
(1990), 22 NSWLR 502 (SC (Austl)) where the settlor created a trust “to 
pay the school tuition fees for the children of Dr Marcus L Sachs … while 
both or either of them remain at school”.
38. If necessary, enforcement on behalf of the children can be through a 
Public Guardian and Trustee, Children’s Lawyer or similar official. See e.g. 
The Public Trustee Act, SA 2004, c P-44.1, s 5(c) [Alberta Public Trustee 
Act]; The Public Guardian and Trustee Act, RSBC 1996, c 383, s 7 [BC 
Public Guardian and Trustee Act]; The Public Guardian and Trustee Act, 
CCSM, c P205, s 5(2)(b) [Manitoba Public Guardian and Trustee Act]; 
The Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C 12, s 47; and The Public 
Trustee Act, RSNS 1989, c 379, s 4(2) [Nova Scotia Public Trustee Act]. 
39. [1968] 3 All ER 65 (Ch) [Re Denley’s].
40. Ibid at 67-69. The facts were a bit more complicated. The trustees wanted 
to sell part of the lands to raise funds to improve the recreational facility 
and asked the court to declare that they had a power to sell part of the 
land. The deed, however, said that if less than 75% of the employees 
were subscribing for the use of the facilities then the property was to go 
to the General Hospital Cheltenham. The General Hospital Cheltenham 
opposed the application since less than 75% of the employees were 
subscribing to use the facility and sought an order that the land be 
conveyed to it. The trustees responded by saying the trust was a purpose 
trust and was therefore not a valid trust so the land should be held by 
them on a resulting trust for the company.
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is directly or indirectly for the benefit of an individual or individuals, it 
seems to me that it is in general outside the mischief of the beneficiary 
principle”.41 
Re Denley’s might be interpreted to simply mean that a trust expressed 
as being for a purpose is valid as long as it can be interpreted as really 
being a trust for persons. This is the interpretation it has been given in 
England and Australia.42 There is, however, Canadian authority relying 
on Re Denley’s for the broader proposition that a purpose trust is valid 
as long as there is some person who can be given standing to enforce 
the trust. In 1989 in Keewatin Tribal Council Inc v City of Thompson,43 
Justice Jewers made reference to Re Denley’s commenting, “[t]he real 
question is one of enforceability and nothing else … there should be no 
problem with a non-charitable purpose trust where there are any number 
of persons with standing to enforce it”. 44
More recently in Peace Hills Trust Co v Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corp,45 Justice Thomas said, “having particular regard to the approach 
taken in Keewatin … a non-charitable purpose trust may be created in 
41. Ibid at 69.
42. See e.g. in England Re Grant’s Will Trusts, [1980] 1 WLR 360 (Ch) at 
370-71; in Australia Tidex v Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd, [1971] 
2 NSWLR 453 (WASC (Austl)) at 465-66; and Strathalbyn Show Jumping 
Club Inc v Mayes (2001), 79 SASR 54 (SASC (Austl)) at 64-66. 
43. Keewatin, supra note 31.
44. Ibid at para 72. No one was actually granted standing to sue as a 
beneficiary in the case. The issue in the case was whether an exemption 
from municipal taxation could be claimed under the particular municipal 
taxing statute that provided an exemption for “lands held in trust for any 
tribe or body of Indians” at para 33. The applicant was Keewatin Tribal 
Council Inc which held title to the lands but purported to hold the lands 
in trust for a “tribe or body of Indians”. It was appealing from a decision 
by the “Board of Revision” which had upheld the imposition of the 
municipal tax on Keewatin Tribal Council Inc. The respondent, the City 
of Thompson, was the taxing municipality.
45. 2007 ABQB 364 [Peace Hills].
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Canada and would be recognized by the courts of this country”.46
C. Validity and Enforcement of Charitable Purpose 
Trusts
1. Crown Enforcement of Charitable Purpose Trusts
An exception to the invalidity of purpose trusts has long been made 
for charitable purpose trusts.47 The Crown, as parens patriae, enforces 
charitable purpose trusts under its prerogative power. Responsibility 
for the enforcement of charitable purpose trusts in Canada is normally 
exercised by the relevant provincial Attorney General.48 The Crown can 
take legal action in response to fraudulent or negligent acts of trustees of 
charitable purpose trusts or the Crown may be called upon in the context 
46. Ibid at para 29. Keewatin, supra note 31, and Peace Hills, ibid, raise 
issues about when the wait-and-see perpetuities legislation provisions 
on purpose trusts apply. Do these provisions only now apply in Canada 
where Keewatin and Peace Hills have no application? Does that leave much 
room for the operation of the wait-and-see legislation provisions? See the 
discussion in Waters, supra note 21. 
47. This goes back at least as far as Morice Ch, supra note 12. See per Grant 
MR in Morice Ch, supra note 12 at 658 and per Lord Eldon on appeal at 
Morice Ch D, supra note 12 at 954. 
48. This role of the Attorney General or Public Trustee has been recognized 
and discussed in several Canadian cases. See e.g. L’Évêque Catholique 
Roman de Bathurst v New Brunswick (Attorney General) 2010 NBBR 372 
(QB); Pathak v Hindu Sabha (2004), 8 ETR (3d) 151 (Ont Sup Ct J); Re 
Baker (1984), 47 OR (2d) 415 (H Ct J) at 420; Re Stillman Estate (2003), 
5 ETR (3d) 260 (Ont Sup Ct J). See the discussion in Waters, Gillen 
& Smith, supra note 6 at 123-25. On the historical development of the 
parens patriae role of the Attorney General in England and Wales and in 
Canada see Kathryn Chan, “The Role of the Attorney General in Charity 
Proceedings in Canada and in England and Wales” (2010) 89:2 Canadian 
Bar Review 373.
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of litigation involving the trust.49 
Some supervision of charitable purpose trusts in Canada is done by 
the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”) 
in the context of the federal Income Tax Act50 exemption of a “registered 
49. See Waters, Gillen & Smith, supra note 6 at 835. The Crown might, for 
example, be called upon in the context of litigation by residuary legatees 
of the estate of a settlor arguing that the trust is not valid and that the 
funds allocated to the trust remain in, or result to, the estate of the settlor. 
The Crown might also be called upon in the context of an administrative 
scheme or cy-près application.
50. RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [Income Tax Act].
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charity”51 from income tax52 and the tax credit for donations to registered 
51. Income Tax Act, supra note 50, a “registered charity” is defined in the 
Act to include a “charitable organization, private foundation or public 
foundation” with the terms “charitable organization”, “private foundation” 
and “public foundation” defined in ss 149.1(1)) and 248(1). Section 
149.1(1) defines a “private foundation” as a “charitable foundation that is 
not a public foundation” and defines a “public foundation” as a “charitable 
foundation” that meets certain conditions set out in the definition. A 
“charitable foundation” is defined in s 149.1(1) as “a corporation or trust 
that is constituted and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, … , 
and that is not a charitable organization”. A “charitable organization” is 
defined in s 149.1(1) as “an organization, whether or not incorporated, 
(a) all the resources of which are devoted to charitable activities carried on 
by the organization itself ”. The Income Tax Act does not define the word 
“charitable” for the “charitable purposes” or “charitable activities” parts of 
the definitions of “charitable foundation” or “charitable organization”. In 
interpreting the meaning of “charitable” for these purposes courts have 
relied on the common law meaning given to “charitable purposes” in the 
context of trust law. See Vancouver Society, supra note 16 at para 143.
52. Income Tax Act, supra note 50, s 149(1)(f ) which says that “no tax 
is payable under this Part on the taxable income of a person for a 
period when that person was … (f ) a registered charity”. Trusts are not 
recognized as separate legal persons but the Income Tax Act treats them 
as taxpayers (see s 104(2)). As taxpayers, trusts are required to pay tax on 
income earned by the trust (e.g. rent on leasehold property, dividends on 
shares or interest on debentures). As with other taxpayers, the trust can, in 
calculating trust income, deduct expenses reasonably incurred in earning 
the income. A particular feature unique to trust taxation under the Income 
Tax Act is that the trust may deduct amounts that became payable to 
beneficiaries during the year (s 104(6)(b)) and amounts so deducted with 
respect to any given beneficiary are to be included in that beneficiary’s 
income for the year (s 104(13)). The trust, therefore, operates as a conduit 
through which income earned on trust investments can flow through to 
the beneficiaries to be taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries. The trust, 
therefore, is only taxed on the income that is retained (i.e. accumulated) 
in the trust). See e.g. Faye Woodman, “Introduction to the Taxation of 
Trusts and Beneficiaries” in Mark R Gillen & Faye Woodman, eds, The 
Law of Trusts: A Contextual Approach, 3d (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2015) at 25-28; and Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, 
Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 8d (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 
537.
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charities.53 Registration as a “registered charity” is required to take 
advantage of the exemption from income tax,54 or to provide receipts 
required for the tax credit.55 The Charities Directorate of the CRA 
assesses applications for registered charity status56 and can remove that 
status where the registered charity is not devoting its funds to charitable 
purposes or engaging in charitable activities.57 Registered charities must 
file reports to facilitate the assessment of whether they are complying with 
53. See Income Tax Act, supra note 50 (s 118.1(3) for the tax credit for 
donations by individuals that provides for a deduction from tax payable 
for “total gifts” for the year, and see s 118.1(1) for the definition of 
“total gifts” that refers to “total charitable gifts” which is also defined in 
s 118.1(1). The definition of “total charitable gifts” refers to gifts to a 
“qualified donee” which is defined in s 149.1(1) to include a “registered 
charity”. See supra note 51 for the definition of “registered charity”. 
See also Income Tax Act, supra note 50, s 110.1(1) for a deduction for 
charitable donations by corporations).
54. See supra note 52.
55. See supra note 53. See also Income Tax Act, supra note 50 that says “a 
gift shall not be included in the total charitable gifts … of an individual 
unless the making of the gift is proven by filing with the Minister (a) a 
receipt for the gift that contains prescribed information” at s 118.1(2).
The prescribed information is set out in Income Tax Regulation, CRC, c 
945, s 3501(1) that refers to “every official receipt issued by a registered 
organization”, and s 3500 defines a “registered organization” to include “a 
registered charity”.
56. To obtain registered charity status as a charitable foundation under 
the Income Tax Act, supra note 50 the foundation must show it will be 
providing its funds to organizations operated for “charitable purposes”. 
See the definition of “registered charity” in supra note 51. To obtain 
registered charity status as a charitable organization under the Income Tax 
Act, the organization must show it will devote its resources exclusively 
to “charitable activities”. See the definition of “charitable organization” 
in Income Tax Act, supra note 50, s 149.1(1). The Income Tax Act does 
not define “charitable purposes” or “charitable activities”. In interpreting 
these terms courts have relied on the common law meaning of “charitable 
purpose” developed in the trust law context (see Vancouver Society, supra 
note 16).
57. See Income Tax Act, supra note 50, ss 149(2)-(4), 168(1).
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the requirements for income tax exempt status.58 The CRA, however, as 
discussed further below,59 likely does not have the incentive or mandate 
to ensure charitable purpose trust funds are being used for the settlor’s 
intended charitable purposes as long as charitable purpose trust funds 
are being used for charitable purposes. It also likely does not have the 
incentive or mandate to ensure the charitable purpose trust funds are 
being used efficiently for the settlor’s intended charitable purposes.
Ontario is unique among the Canadian common law jurisdictions 
in having legislation relating to the enforcement of charitable purpose 
trusts.60 In particular, the Ontario Charities Accounting Act requires a 
donee of property to be held for charitable purposes to give notice of 
the trust to the Public Guardian and Trustee.61 The Public Guardian 
and Trustee may request information of the trustee concerning the 
trust including the condition, disposition or other such particulars as 
requested of the property held in trust or as to any other matter relating 
to the administration or management of the trust.62 The Public Guardian 
and Trustee may also request of the trustee information concerning 
dealings with the property “to be passed and examined and audited by 
a judge of the Superior Court of Justice”.63 The Public Guardian and 
Trustee may apply to court for an order where, among other matters, the 
trustee is found to have misapplied or misappropriated trust property, 
made an improper or unauthorized investment or is not applying the 
trust property in the manner directed by the trust instrument.64 The Act 
also allows any two or more persons who allege a breach of a charitable 
purpose trust or who seek the direction of the court for the administration 
58. Ibid, s 149(14) together with Forms T3010, T1235, TF725 and 
publication T4033 “Completing the Registered Charity Information 
Return”.
59. See Part IV.B, below.
60. Charities Accounting Act, RSO 1990, c C 10.
61. Ibid, s 1 which deals with an inter vivos instrument – presumably the 
Public Trustee and Guardian will have notice of a will that has received 
probate.
62. Ibid, s 2. This applies to both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. 
63. Ibid, s 3.
64. Ibid, s 4.
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of a charitable purpose trust to apply to court, with notice to the Public 
Guardian and Trustee, to hear the application and make such order as the 
court considers just for the carrying out of the trust.65 
In England and Wales there is a Charity Commission that performs its 
functions on behalf of the Crown.66 Its functions include: (i) determining 
whether institutions are charities or not; (ii) identifying and investigating 
apparent misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of 
charities and taking remedial or protective action in that connection;67 
(iii) giving such advice or guidance it considers appropriate with respect to 
the administration of charities;68 and (iv) the maintenance of an accurate 
and up-to-date register of charities.69 Subject to certain exemptions,70 
every charity is required to be registered with the registry, including the 
name of the charity and other information as the Charity Commission 
thinks fit.71 The Charity Commission has the power to make inquiries 
concerning a charity72 and has the discretion to publish the results of the 
65. Ibid, s 10. Section 10 also allows the court to make an order directing the 
Public Guardian and Trustee to conduct an investigation of a charitable 
purpose trust and make a report to the Attorney General.
66. The Charity Commission is continued under the Charities Act 2011 
(UK), c 25, s 13. The Charity Commission had its origins in mid-19th 
century legislation (Charitable Trusts Act, 1860 (UK), 23 & 24 Vict, 
c 136). The powers of the Charity Commission were increased in the 
Charities Act 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz II, c 58 (replaced by the Charities Act 1993 
(UK), c 10 then by the Charities Act 2006 (UK), c 50 and subsequently 
by the Charities Act 2011 (UK), c 25 [Charities Act 2011]). The Charity 
Commission is not subject to the direction or control of any Minister of 
the Crown or of another government department (see Charities Act 2011, 
s 13(4)) although it is subject to administrative controls by the Treasury 
over its expenditures (see Charities Act 2011, s 13(5)).
67. Charities Act 2011, supra note 66, s 15(1).
68. Ibid, s 15(2).
69. Ibid, s 15(4).
70. There is, for example, an exemption for charities with less £5,000 in gross 
income. See ibid, s 30(2)(d). 
71. Ibid, ss 29(2), 30.
72. Ibid, s 46 (including broad powers in connection with inquiries – see also 
ss 47-53).
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inquiry.73 Proceedings concerning a charity can be brought by any of the 
trustees of the charity, “any person interested in the charity” or by any 
two or more inhabitants of the area of a charity where it is a local charity74 
and where the Charity Commission authorises such proceedings.75
2. Exclusivity and the Enforcement of Charitable Purpose 
Trusts
A charitable purpose trust principle that is related to the question of 
enforcement of charitable purpose trusts is the requirement that such a 
trust be exclusively for charitable purposes.76 A purported trust will not 
be a valid charitable purpose trust if it is partly for a charitable purpose 
and partly for some non-charitable purpose or partly for persons. The 
reason given for this principle is that if the trust had a charitable purpose 
combined with a non-charitable purpose or was, in part, for a defined class 
of persons, the trustee would have the discretion to use the funds for the 
charitable or non-charitable purposes or for persons. That would make it 
hard to enforce use of the trust property for the charitable purposes since 
the trustee might simply answer that it was within his discretion to use 
73. s 50. Australia also has a statutory scheme for charities regulation and 
enforcement including charitable trusts. See e.g. the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth); and see “Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Statement: Regulatory 
Approach”, online: Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
<www.acnc.gov.au>. 
74. Charities Act 2011, supra note 66, s 115(1). 
75. Ibid, s 115(2). Where the Charities Commission refuses to grant authority 
an application can be made to a judge of the High Court attached to the 
Chancery Division for leave to take proceedings.
76. On this exclusivity requirement see e.g. Morice Ch, supra note 12; Vezey 
v Jamson (1822), 57 ER 27 (Ch); Hunter v Attorney-General, [1899] AC 
309 (HL) at 323-24; Re MacDuff, [1896] 2 Ch 451 (CA (Eng)) at 464-66 
[Re MacDuff]; Re Eades, [1920] 2 Ch 353 (Eng); and Chichester Diocesan 
Fund & Board of Finance Inc v Simpson, [1944] 2 All ER 60 (HL). In 
Canada see e.g. Brewer v McCauley, [1954] SCR 645 [Brewer]; and Jones 
v Executive Officers of the T Eaton Company Limited, [1973] SCR 635 
[Eaton]. 
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the funds for the non-charitable purposes or for persons.77 
This exclusivity principle has the unfortunate capacity to invalidate 
many charitable purposes that have been inadvertently mixed with non-
charitable purposes or with trusts for persons.78 Courts have used several 
techniques to avoid such unfortunate outcomes.79 Several common law 
77. Morice Ch D, supra note 12. This reason was given by Lord Eldon where 
he says that “the true question is, whether, if upon the one hand he might 
have devoted the whole to purposes, in this sense charitable, he might not 
equally according to the intention have devoted the whole to purposes 
benevolent and liberal, and yet not within the meaning of charitable 
purposes, as this Court construes those words; and, if according to the 
intention it was competent to him to do so, I do not apprehend, that 
under any authority upon such words the Court could have charged him 
with mal-administration, if he had applied the whole to purposes, which 
according to the meaning of the testator are benevolent and liberal” at 
955. Similarly, Grant MR’s earlier decision in Morice Ch, supra note 12 
said, “[t]he question is, not, whether he may not apply it upon purposes 
strictly charitable, but whether he is bound so to apply it?” at 659. This 
reasoning was accepted in Re MacDuff, supra note 76 at 465.
78. The settlor may, for instance, have directed funds to be used for 
“philanthropic” purposes (see e.g. Brewer, supra note 76), “benevolent” 
purposes (see e.g. Lawrence v Lawrence (1913), 42 NBR 260 (SC), 
“worthy” purposes (see e.g. Planta v Greenshields, [1931] 1 WWR 401 
(BCCA)) or “public” purposes (see e.g. Cox v Hogan (1924), 35 BCR 286 
(SC) although the majority held the gift to be charitable on the basis of 
added words that limited the public purposes to specified purposes that 
were charitable). However commendable such purposes may be, they do 
not fall within the legal meaning of “charitable purposes”.
79. Courts have, for instance, interpreted the intention apparently expressed 
as an intention to devote the trust property to both charitable and non-
charitable purposes as really being an intention to have all the property 
devoted to charitable purposes (see e.g. Eaton, supra note 76). They have 
also read the non-charitable part as charitable based on who the donee is 
(see e.g. Blais v Touchet, [1963] SCR 358 where the donee was a bishop 
and the donor was a priest). Courts have also sometimes severed the non-
charitable portion. See e.g. Re Coxen, [1948] 2 All ER 492 (Ch); Re Porter, 
[1925] Ch 746 (Eng); Re Clarke, [1923] 2 Ch 407 (Eng); and Salusbury 
v Denton (1857), 69 ER 1219 (Ch). They have also sometimes found the 
non-charitable purpose to be merely ancillary to the charitable purposes 
(Guaranty Trust, supra note 16).
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jurisdictions have enacted a provision to address this concern,80 although 
the provisions typically contain what might be said to be flaws limiting 
their application.81 The Uniform Trustee Act addresses this concern by 
providing, in section 75(1), that, “a trust is not void by reason only 
that the objects of the trust consist of a charitable purpose and a non-
charitable purpose”. Section 75(3) gives the court powers to make orders 
addressing issues of combined valid charitable and non-charitable trusts, 
separating them where possible and otherwise dealing with situations 
80. Early examples include, for example, in Australia Property Law Act 1958 
(Vic), s 131; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 37D; Trustees Act 1962 
(WA), s 102; in New Zealand, Charitable Trusts Act 1957 as amended by 
An Act to Amend Charitable Trusts 1957 (NZ), 1957/18 s 4(1) adding s 
61B to the Charitable Trusts Act 1957; in Ireland, Charities Act, 1961, Act 
No 17 of 1961, s 49; and in Northern Ireland, Charities Act (Northern 
Ireland), 1964, c 33, s 24. For British Columbia see the Law and Equity 
Act, RSBC 1996, c 253, s 47 [Law and Equity Act]. For Alberta see the 
Wills Act, RSA 2000, c W-12, s 32; for New Brunswick see Wills Act, 
RSNB 1973, c W-9, s 30; and for Manitoba see the Trustee Act, CCSM, c 
Tl60, s 91.
81. British Columbia Law and Equity Act, ibid, says, for example, that “[i]
f a person gives, devises or bequeaths property in trust for a charitable 
purpose that is linked conjunctively or disjunctively in the instrument 
by which the trust is created with a non-charitable purpose, and the 
gift, devise or bequest would be void for uncertainty or remoteness, 
the gift, devise or bequest is not invalid as a result but operates solely 
for the benefit of the charitable purpose” at s 47. One of the problems 
with this provision is that the charitable purpose must be linked “linked 
conjunctively or disjunctively … a non-charitable purpose” and, therefore, 
does not deal with expressions such as “such benevolent purposes as my 
trustees choose”, “such worthy objects as my trustees shall select” or “the 
general benefit of children in the Sick Children’s Hospital”. Another 
problem is that the provision only applies if the “gift, devise or bequest 
would be void for uncertainty or remoteness”. If the gift, devise or bequest 
is not uncertain and not void for remoteness, the provision would not 
apply. It is not clear how the provision would fit with the wait-and-see 
perpetuity legislation provisions that treat a trust for a “specific non-
charitable purpose that creates no enforceable equitable interest in a 
specific person” as a valid trust but to be construed “as a power to appoint 
the income or capital”.
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where they are not separable.82
3. Political Purposes and Charitable Purpose Trusts
It is also important to note for the discussion in Part VIII, below, that 
even if a trust is for an exclusively charitable purpose that provides a 
public benefit, it will not be a valid charitable purpose trust if it is for 
“political purposes”.83 “Political purposes” include not just the promotion 
of a particular candidate in an election, a political party or political ideas, 
but also any attempt to influence the legislative or executive process, to 
influence domestic, or foreign, laws or government policy or to improve 
international relations.84 The reason given for the rule is that the court 
has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or 
82. Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 75(3). Paragraphs (a), (b), (c) provide 
for the separation of mixed charitable and non-charitable purposes where 
it is “practicable” to separate them. Paragraph (d) through (g) provide for 
various situations where the court finds it is not practicable to separate 
mixed charitable and non-charitable purposes. 
83. See Bowman v Secular Society, [1917] AC 406 (HL) [Bowman]. In Canada 
see Re Loney Estate (1953), 9 WWR (2d) 366 (Man QB); and Ontario 
(Public Trustee) v Toronto Humane Society (1987), 60 OR (2d) 236 (HCt 
J).
84. McGovern v Attorney-General, [1982] Ch 321 (Eng) at 340 followed in 
Canada in Human Life International in Canada Inc v Minister of National 
Revenue, [1998] 2 FC 202 (CA).
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will not be for the public benefit.85 Many have been critical of this rule.86
III. The Potential Public-Private Trust Overlap
This part begins by noting the public-private distinction that has 
sometimes been used to distinguish charitable purpose trusts from 
express trusts for persons. Subpart B notes the public benefit requirement 
for the validity of charitable purpose trusts and discusses how courts 
have defined “public” in assessing that requirement. Subpart C argues 
that express trusts for persons and non-charitable purpose trusts can 
potentially have “public” qualities.
A. Public Trusts and Private Trusts
A public-private distinction is sometimes made between charitable 
purpose trusts and express trusts for persons. Charitable purpose trusts, 
are sometimes referred to as “public trusts”. Express trusts for persons 
and  non-charitable purpose trusts are sometimes referred to as “private 
trusts”.87 Charitable purpose trusts are, in part, “public” in the sense that 
the purposes are normally directed to a broader community and not just 
85. See Bowman, supra note 83 at 417. In other words, in assessing public 
benefit the court would be put in the position of saying that there would 
be a public benefit to changing the law (i.e. implicitly saying the law was a 
bad law) when it might subsequently be bound to enforce that law.
86. See e.g. Paul Michell, “The Political Purposes Doctrine in Canadian 
Charities Law” (1995) 12:4 The Philanthropist 3 at 4-6; Henry G 
Intven, “Political Activity and Charitable Organisations” (1983) 3:3 
The Philanthropist 35; LA Sheridan, “Charity Versus Politics” (1973) 
2 Anglo-American Law Review 47; LA Sheridan, “The Charpol Family 
Quiz: A Game of Skill and Luck Played on the Boundaries of Charity and 
Politics” (1977) 2:1 The Philanthropist 14; and Abraham Drassinower, 
“The Doctrine of Political Purposes in the Law of Charities: A Conceptual 
Analysis” in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman & David Stevens, eds, Between 
State and Market: Essays on Canadian Charities Law and Policy (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 288.
87. Mowbray, supra note 3 at 22; Pettit, supra note 4 at 74; Thomas & 
Hudson, supra note 3 at 24; McGhee, supra note 3 at 683-84; Oosterhoff, 
Chambers & McInnes, supra note 3 at 24; Waters, Gillen & Smith, supra 
note 6 at 29. 
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the benefit of particular private interests.88 Charitable purpose trusts 
are also “public” in the sense that the Crown (i.e. “the State”) is given 
standing to enforce such trusts. Enforcement by the Crown involves 
expenditure, although perhaps modest, of government funds provided at 
taxpayer expense. Charitable purpose trusts have another “public” quality 
in that they can benefit, as described above, from tax subsidies under the 
federal Income Tax Act.89 
B. The “Public” and “Private” Aspects of Charitable 
Purpose Trusts
It has been noted that a charitable purpose trust is a hybrid of private and 
public relationships.90 This might be articulated in terms of a distinction 
between public law and private law that is said to have its roots in 
the jurisprudential model established by the Romans in which law is 
88. See the reference to the public benefit requirement, supra note 10 and 
the accompanying text, and see infra Part III.C on the public aspects 
of charitable purpose trusts. Charitable purpose trusts are “normally,” 
not always, directed to a broader community since there are recognized 
exceptions to the public benefit requirement with respect to “poor 
relations” and “poor employees” (see Part III.C, below).
89. See supra notes 50-58 and the accompanying text.
90. See Mayo Moran, “Rethinking Public Benefit: The Definition of Charity 
in the Era of the Charter” in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman & David 
Stevens, eds, Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy 
in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001) 251 “the charitable 
trust is neither a purely private nor a purely public institution; instead 
it is a hybrid of public and private relationships and must be assessed as 
such” at 257. On the public and private overlap of charitable purpose 
trusts see also e.g. Mark Freedland, “Charity Law and the Public/Private 
Distinction” in Charles Mitchell & Susan R Moody, eds, Foundations of 
Charity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000); Adam Parachin, “Regulating 
Philanthropy: Is Charity Public or Private” (CBA National Charity Law 
Symposium, Toronto, 4 May 2012) 111; and Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, 
“Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private 
Philanthropy?” (2010) 85 Chicago-Kent Law Review 571 which focuses 
largely on charities organized as not-for-profit corporations, but much 
of what it says about the public and private aspects of charities could be 
extended to charities organized as trusts (i.e. charitable purpose trusts).
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conceived of as having relationships between person and person, person 
and thing and person and the state.91 Relationships between person 
and person gave rise to actions in personam.92 Relationships between 
person and thing gave rise to actions in rem.93 Public law would involve 
relationships between persons and the state and would include actions 
by the state against persons.94 It is also said to include laws of general 
application.95 Charitable purpose trusts have a public law quality to them 
in the sense that they can be enforced by the Crown and therefore involve 
actions by the state against persons (the trustees).
There is also a private law quality to charitable purpose trusts in that 
charitable purpose trusts can be created by persons exercising rights with 
respect to property they own. Persons creating the trust can create their 
own scheme for the administration of the trust under which persons 
assenting to act as trustees will be under a legal obligation to carry out. 
It is, in effect, a legally enforceable promise to the person, or persons, 
creating the trust made by the persons assenting to be trustees to act for 
the benefit of others according to the terms of the trust instrument.96
There is another “public” quality to charitable purpose trusts, 
although perhaps not “public law” in the sense described above. A 
91. See Geoffrey Samuel, “Public and Private Law: A Private Lawyer’s 
Response” (1983) 46 Modern Law Review 558 at 558-59.
92. Ibid at 559.
93. Ibid.
94. See e.g. Herbert M Kritzer, Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social, 
and Cultural Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002) vol III at 
1339; and Black’s Law Dictionary, 10d, sub verbo “public law” [Black’s Law 
Dictionary].
95.  Kritzer, supra note 94 at 1340; and Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 94, 
sub verbo “public law”.
96. See John H Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts” 
(1995) 105:3 Yale Law Journal 625 at 627. This connection between trust 
and contract was also suggested long ago by the well-known equity scholar 
Maitland. According to Maitland, “the use or trust was originally regarded 
as an obligation, in point of fact a contract though not usually so called”. 
See Frederic W Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, in AH Chaytor 
and WJ Whittaker, eds, 1d (1909), John Brunyate, ed, rev’d 2d (1936) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936; reprinted 1969) at 110.
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charitable purpose trust is “public” in the sense of the definition of 
“public” as “members of the community in general or a particular section 
of this”.97 This is reflected in the requirement that, for a trust to be valid 
as a charitable purpose trust, the trust must provide a “public benefit”.98 
The main, oft-referred to, case on what constitutes the “public” aspect of 
“public benefit” is the 1951 decision of the House of Lords in Oppenheim 
v Tobacco Securities Trust Company99 (“Oppenheim”). The purported 
trust in issue provided for “the education of children of employees or 
former employees of British-American Tobacco Co Ltd … or any of its 
subsidiary or allied companies”.100 Since the trust was for education, it fit 
the charitable purpose of advancement of education. The question was 
whether there was a public benefit. Lord Simonds held that to constitute 
the “public” the beneficiaries must be a “section of the community”101 
and he went on to say that:
these words ‘section of the community’ have no special sanctity, but they 
conveniently indicate, that the possible (I emphasize the word ‘possible’) 
beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and secondly, that the 
quality which distinguishes them from the community, so that they form by 
themselves a section of it, must be a quality which does not depend on their 
97. This wording is from The Oxford Paperback Dictionary, 4d, sub verbo 
“public”. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d, sub verbo “public” has a 
similar definition that says “[a] particular section, group, or portion of a 
community or of mankind”. Brody & Tyler, supra note 90 argue against 
the notion that the state is justified in subjecting charities to broad-
based government control over their governance, structures, missions, 
effectiveness, programs and other operations on the basis that property 
directed to charitable purposes is “public money” (in the sense that the 
purposes are public purposes) and on the basis that charities are enforced 
by the state.
98. See supra Part II.A.
99. [1951] AC 297 (HL) [Oppenheim]. The meaning of “public benefit” is 
canvassed in Gerald Henry Louis Fridman, “Charities and Public Benefit” 
(1953) 31 Canadian Business Review 537 which reviews the Oppenheim 
case and cases leading up to the Oppenheim case. 
100. Oppenheim, supra note 99 at 298.
101. Ibid at 306.
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relationship to a particular individual.102
It was held that the purported trust did not satisfy the public benefit 
requirement and therefore did not qualify as a charitable purpose trust. 
There were over 110,000 employees of the various companies, but 
whether one was a beneficiary depended on whether one was a child of 
an employee of the companies and it, therefore, ultimately depended 
on the relationship to a particular person, namely, the British-American 
Tobacco Co Ltd as employer.103
A justification for the first part of this public benefit or section of 
the community test (the “not numerically negligible” part) might be that 
there must be a sufficient benefit from the trust to warrant the potential 
expenditure of taxpayer funds to enforce it. The test seems to suggest 
that, even if the benefit is small on a per person basis, the total public 
benefit is more likely substantial if there are many persons who might 
benefit. The test, however, refers to the “number of possible beneficiaries” 
and it was specifically noted in the case that the number of persons 
actually benefiting can be quite small as long as the possible number of 
beneficiaries is high.104
It is the second part of the test that attempts to distinguish between 
trusts created for a public purpose and those created for private reasons. 
This arguably makes sense in terms of the potential expenditure of 
taxpayer funds on enforcement. Taxpayer funds should presumably 
not be expended to enforce a trust created for purely private interests. 
This justification would, presumably, be much stronger for a charitable 
purpose trust that is exempt from income tax and for which a tax credit 
is given for donations to the trust.105 If a person wants to create a trust 
that provides private benefits, the mechanism for enforcement should 
102. Ibid, per Lord Simonds: “a group of persons may be numerous but, if the 
nexus between them is their personal relationship to a single propositus or 
to several propositi, they are neither the community nor a section of the 
community for charitable purposes”.
103. Ibid at 299.
104. Ibid at 306.
105. On these Income Tax Act provisions see supra notes 50-58 and the 
accompanying text.
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arguably be one that does not rely on a public enforcement mechanism 
or for which tax subsidies are provided.
While the second part of the test in Oppenheim attempts to make 
a distinction between trusts that provide “public” benefits and those 
that provide “private” benefits, there are, arguably, problems with 
how effectively it performs that function. In Oppenheim itself Lord 
MacDermott, dissenting, questioned whether a distinction should be 
drawn between “those who are employed in a particular industry before 
it is nationalized and those who are employed therein after that process 
has been completed and one employer has taken the place of many”.106 
Lord MacDermott was, in other words, noting that under the second 
part of the test a trust for the education of children in a coal industry 
with many employers would be valid, but after nationalization, with just 
one employer, the same trust would not be valid.
Another curious qualification on the public-private distinction in 
the context of charitable purpose trusts is that an exception has been 
made for charitable purpose trusts for the relief of poverty. Courts have 
accepted as valid, charitable purpose trusts that are for relief of poverty 
of “poor relations”107 or “poor employees”.108 While the House of Lords 
expressed reservations about such exceptions, these exceptions had been 
106. Oppenheim, supra note 99.
107. See e.g. Isaac v Defriez (1754), 27 ER 387 (Ch); and Re Scarisbrick, 
[1951] Ch 622 (CA (Eng)) (a trust for “such relations” as “shall be in 
needy circumstances”). The exception did not apply on the facts of the 
Oppenheim, supra note 99, since there the purported trust was for the 
advancement of education not the relief of poverty. In Re Cox [1951] OR 
205 at 224 (CA), aff’d [1953] 1 SCR 94, aff’d [1955] 2 All ER 550 (PC 
(Canada)) [Re Cox], Justice Roach of the Ontario Court of Appeal could 
see no reason for there being an exception for relief of poverty but not for 
advancement of education.
108. For England see e.g. Dingle v Turner, [1972] 1 All ER 878 (HL); and 
Gibson v South American Store (Gath & Chaves) Ltd, [1950] Ch 177 (CA 
(Eng)) at 191-97. For Canada see Re Massey Estate, [1959] OR 608 (HCt 
J); and Eaton, supra note 76. 
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long accepted in a series of first instance English decisions.109
C. Potential “Public” Aspect for Trusts for Persons and 
Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
While charitable purpose trusts have been referred to as “public trusts” 
and express trusts for persons referred to as “private trusts,” even private 
trusts can provide benefits to a community of persons and can, therefore, 
take on a “public” quality. Non-charitable purpose trusts that were not 
considered legally valid under the common law can also take on a “public” 
quality. The potential for each of these types of private trusts to take on a 
“public” quality is discussed below.
1. Express Trusts for Persons
As noted above, an express trust for persons can describe a class of 
beneficiaries. The example of a class of beneficiaries given in Part 
II.A, above, was the “grandchildren” of a particular person. Even if 
the particular person has hundreds of grandchildren, most persons, 
it is submitted, would be likely to consider trusts with such a class of 
beneficiaries, or potential beneficiaries, to be “private” in nature. The class 
defined in an express trust for persons can, however, be much broader. In 
the 1971 House of Lords decision in McPhail v Doulton110 (“McPhail”), 
for example, Mr. Baden, by deed, purported to settle property on trust 
instructing the trustees to “apply the net income of the fund in making at 
their absolute discretion grants to or for the benefit of any of the officers 
and employees or ex-officers or ex-employees of the company [Mathew 
Hall & Co Ltd] or to any relatives or dependents of any such persons in 
such amounts and on such conditions (if any) as they think fit”.111 The 
purported trust was not expressed to be for the relief of poverty of these 
persons or to advance their education. It was, therefore, not a charitable 
109. See Oppenheim, supra note 99 at 306-307. See also, the reservations of the 
Privy Council as to common employment trusts in Re Cox, supra note 107 
at 552, affirming (1952), [1953] 1 SCR 94. For some of the first instance 
cases the House of Lords was referring to see supra notes 107-108.
110. McPhail, supra note 9.
111. Ibid at 437, 447.
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purpose trust. The class of beneficiaries was potentially quite wide. One 
of the requirements for the establishment of a valid express trust for 
persons is that there must be certainty of beneficiaries. It was held that the 
requirement of certainty of beneficiaries is met if the class of beneficiaries 
is sufficiently clearly defined that “it can be said with certainty that any 
given individual is or is not a member of the class”.112 When the matter 
returned to be reassessed by the High Court armed with this guidance 
from the House of Lords it was found that Mr. Baden’s purported trust 
met this test.113 This was affirmed by a unanimous Court of Appeal with 
the words “relatives” and “dependents” being held to meet the test set out 
by the House of Lords.114 The test for certainty of beneficiaries set out by 
the House of Lords in McPhail has been accepted in Canada115 and could, 
presumably, allow for a very large group of persons. One qualification 
suggested by Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords was that the trust 
objects could not be so wide as to be “administratively unworkable”.116 
They could not, he said, be so hopelessly wide as not to form “anything 
like a class”.117
The McPhail test for certainty of beneficiaries for a discretionary 
trust can allow for a very broad class of beneficiaries having potentially 
little direct connection with the settlor. The trust in McPhail had such a 
quality in that it provided that the trustees apply the net income of the 
fund “for the benefit of any of the officers and employees or ex-officers 
or ex-employees of the company or to any relatives or dependants of any 
such persons in such amounts at such times and on such conditions ... 
112. Ibid at 450.
113. Re Baden’s Trust Deeds (No 2), [1971] 3 All ER 985 (Ch), aff’d on appeal, 
[1972] 2 All ER 1304 (CA).
114. Ibid.
115. See e.g. Eaton, supra note 76; Dickson v Richardson (1981), 32 OR (2d) 
158 (CA); Canada Trust Co v Ontario Human Rights Commission (1990), 
74 OR (2d) 481 (CA); and Lewis v Union of BC Performers (1996), 18 
BCLR (3d) 382 (CA). 
116. McPhail, supra note 9 at 441. 
117. Ibid. Lord Wilberforce suggested that “[a]ll the residents of Greater 
London,” might be an example.
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as they think fit”.118 The range of potential beneficiaries in such a trust 
could be quite broad. The nature of the “benefit” was apparently not 
constrained, and therefore was not “charitable” in the legal sense119 and 
might also have not been considered charitable in a popular sense, except, 
perhaps that it likely had a wealth redistribution quality since the settlor, 
Mr. Baden, was likely reasonably well off relative to the employees, their 
relatives and dependents.
Eaton120 also provides an example of the potential for a discretionary 
express trust to have a public quality in providing for a potentially wide 
range of persons in a way that might be considered socially beneficial. In 
that case the testator provided a specified amount be paid to the executive 
officers of the Eaton Company to be used “for any needy or deserving 
Toronto members of the Eaton Quarter Century Club”. The club was not 
a charitable organization, but a social club, the members of which were 
persons who had been in the service of the Eaton Company for twenty-
five years or more. By the time the litigation arose the club had 7,000 
members who had worked, or were still working, for the Eaton Company, 
or who had retired. “Needy” was accepted as a charitable purpose relating 
to relief of poverty. The issue from the charitable trust perspective was 
whether “deserving” was for a charitable purpose. The trust was upheld 
as a charitable purpose trust interpreting “deserving” as what the testator 
presumably had in mind in the 1934 Great Depression context of the 
trust.121 The trust was also upheld as a trust for persons applying the 
McPhail test interpreting “Toronto members” to mean “those members 
who were employed by the company in Toronto at the time when they 
became members”.122 While the number of beneficiaries would have been 
less than all the 7,000 members of the club at the time of the litigation, 
118. Ibid at 433.
119. It was not “charitable” in the legal sense since it was not limited to the 
traditional heads of charitable purposes and the funds could, therefore, 
have been used for non-charitable purposes. It would, therefore, not have 
been charitable under the exclusivity requirement for a valid charitable 
purpose trust (see Part II.C.2 above).
120. Eaton, supra note 76.
121. Ibid at 642-43. 
122. Ibid at 651.
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it would, given the number likely employed by the company in Toronto, 
presumably have included a fairly large number of persons. As Eaton 
demonstrates, an express trust for persons can have a large number of 
beneficiaries and can have a public quality with the beneficiaries having 
a very limited connection to the settlor of the trust and with the trust 
having a public purpose quality given that the funds were to be used for 
persons who were “needy or deserving”. 
While the trust in Oppenheim was found, in 1951, not to meet 
the requirement of “public benefit” given the way “public benefit” was 
defined in that case, the funds were to be used for the education of the 
beneficiaries which was considered “charitable” under the traditional 
legal definition of “charitable purposes” and otherwise might be said to 
provide a benefit to a potentially large number of persons. If one were 
to argue the Oppenheim case today, one might well argue that it meets 
the 1972 McPhail test for certainty of beneficiaries.123 The trust might, 
therefore, be valid as an express trust for persons with the potential 
number of beneficiaries being very large and with a purpose that might 
be considered to have a public quality.
Even broader examples of the potential use of an express trust for 
persons with public qualities could be provided. An express trust for 
persons might, for instance, be used to create a form of governance 
for a broad group of persons such as a particular Aboriginal group, 
assuming such persons could be sufficiently clearly defined to meet the 
McPhail test.124 An express trust for persons might also be used to set 
123. Oppenheim, supra note 99 was decided in 1951 long before McPhail, supra 
note 9, which was decided in 1972. The beneficiaries in Oppenheim were 
“children of employees or former employees of British-American Tobacco 
Co Ltd … or any of its subsidiary or allied companies” at 298 (see supra 
note 100 and the accompanying text) and this description of a class of 
beneficiaries, it is submitted, would probably meet the test of certainty for 
a discretionary trust for persons under the McPhail test.
124. See e.g. Daryn R Leas & Victoria B Fred, “Yukon First Nation Trusts: 
Establishing a Legacy for Future Generations”, online: Council of Yukon 
First Nations <www.sgsyukon.ca> (on this use of trusts for First Nations).
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up a community ecosystem trust125 or for an environmental restoration 
trust.126
2. Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
A non-charitable purpose trust can have a public quality both in terms 
of the number of potential beneficiaries (who may well not be related 
to the settlor), and because the purpose may provide a public, or broad 
community, benefit. The facts in Re Lipinski’s Will Trusts127 provide an 
example of this. In that case the testator made a bequest to the Hull 
Judeans (Maccabi) Association “in memory of my late wife to be used 
solely in the work of constructing the new buildings for the Association 
and/or improvements to the said buildings”.128 The Hull Judeans 
(Maccabi) Association was an unincorporated association that had been 
established to provide “social, cultural and sporting activities for Jewish 
youth in Hull, or for such Jewish youth in Hull as become members 
125. On community ecosystems trusts see Michael McGonigle, Brian Egan & 
Lisa Ambus, The Community Ecosystem Trust: A New Model for Developing 
Sustainability (Victoria: POLIS Project on Ecological Governance, 
University of Victoria, 2001), online: POLIS Project on Ecological 
Governance < www.polisproject.org>.
126. On the use of an express trust to set up an environmental restoration 
trust see Donovan WM Waters, “The Role of the Trust in Environmental 
Protection Law” in Donovan WM Waters, ed, Equity, Fiduciaries and 
Trusts 1993 (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) 383 at 405-19.
127. [1976] Ch 235 (Eng) [Re Lipinski’s]. The focus here is on borrowing the 
facts from Re Lipinski’s case as an example of a non-charitable purpose 
trust that has a public benefit quality. The testator’s gift was upheld in 
the case but while different possible bases for upholding the gift were 
discussed, it is not clear from the case on which basis it was upheld (or if 
it was upheld on each basis discussed). On the difficulty in pinning down 
on just what basis the trust was upheld see e.g. Nigel P Gravells, “Gifts to 
Unincorporated Associations: Where There’s a Will There’s a Way” (1977) 
40:2 Modern Law Review 231 generally and especially where it is said 
that, “the reasoning in the judgment and the criteria adopted to avoid the 
conclusion of total invalidity of the gift may create yet more uncertainty 
for draftsmen in the future” at 236.
128. Gravells, supra note 127 at 237.
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of the association”.129 Such a trust might be valid as a trust for persons 
(consistent with Re Denley’s130). If, however, it could not be found valid as 
a trust for persons and was held to be a non-charitable purpose trust,131 it 
would nonetheless potentially benefit a large number of persons (Jewish 
youth in Hull) who might be said to represent a section of the community. 
That section of the community may well have had a minimal connection 
to the settlor and the purpose of the intended trust, “social, cultural and 
sporting activities,” might have been considered one that provided a 
public benefit.
Many other non-charitable purpose trusts might have a public quality 
in the sense of benefiting a substantial community of persons and in a way 
that might be considered to be for the general benefit of society. Suppose, 
for example, funds were raised to be held on trust for the purpose of 
promoting the development of technologies that would reduce global 
warming. Such a trust would likely not be charitable in many common 
law jurisdictions but it could provide what, it is submitted, would be 
accepted by many persons as a public benefit and that benefit could be a 
benefit for virtually everyone in the world. 
IV. Enforcement Problems Across All Three Types of  
Express Trusts
This part notes the potential for weak enforcement is not limited to 
non-charitable purpose trusts.132 Weak enforcement can also arise for 
charitable purpose trusts and even in express trusts for persons. 
129. Ibid at 238.
130. See Re Denley’s, supra note 39.
131. Justice Oliver held in Re Lipinski’s, supra note 127 at 243, that the 
purposes of the unincorporated Hull Judeans (Maccabi) Association were 
not charitable purposes. To the extent, therefore, that the members of the 
association were to hold the funds on trust to build or improve buildings 
for the association, or otherwise for the purposes of the association, it 
would not be a trust for charitable purposes.
132. See supra notes 20-23 and the accompanying text on enforcement 
problems as a primary reason for the non-validity of non-charitable 
purpose trusts.
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A. Addressing Enforcement Problems for Non-
Charitable Purpose Trusts
The lack of a person in whose favour the court can decree performance 
has been given as the basis for the non-validity of non-charitable purpose 
trusts. There are no beneficiaries to enforce such trusts. Where the 
creator of the trust has retained the services of a knowledgeable trust 
draftsperson, the trust draftsperson, recognizing that the settlor’s purpose 
is non-charitable or that there is significant doubt as to whether the 
purpose is charitable, has to find a way to either reconceive of the trust as 
a trust for persons, fit it into a recognized charitable purpose or abandon 
the trust form in favour of some other form such as a corporate form.133 
Such attempts to reconceive the trust are likely not to achieve what the 
settlor wants. They may, indeed, fall considerably short of what the settlor 
wants and may fall so far short that the settlor abandons the notion 
of devoting funds to his or her intended purpose. If the settlor’s non-
charitable purpose is reasonably certain and is not illegal or contrary to 
public policy, there seems no reason not to attempt to achieve the settlor’s 
purpose by permitting the purpose to be enforced as a trustee obligation 
and not just as a trustee power as long as some means of enforcement 
can be provided.134 Where the settlor’s purpose happens to benefit a 
reasonably substantial section of the community there would seem to 
133. A corporate form (likely a not-for-profit corporate form) would 
have members who could enforce the objects of the corporation. An 
unincorporated association might also be considered in which members 
would have a contractual basis for enforcing compliance with the objects 
of the unincorporated association.
134. Enforcement as a power is the approach taken by wait-and-see perpetuities 
legislation in Canada (see supra notes 34-36 and the accompanying text) 
and the approach effectively taken in Re Thompson, supra note 28 (see 
supra notes 32-33 and the accompanying text). 
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be all the more reason to facilitate its enforcement.135 The grounds for 
facilitating enforcement of the settlor’s purpose would, it is submitted, be 
that much stronger where the settlor has provided funds to be used for a 
non-charitable purpose to which taxpayer funds are currently directed.136 
While other forms, such as a not-for-profit corporation or an 
unincorporated association might achieve the same objective, the trust 
may provide the advantage of flexibility. There will also be situations in 
which persons without legal assistance, or sometimes even with legal 
assistance, purport to create trusts for non-charitable purposes instead 
of relying on alternate forms. It is arguably unfortunate that such trusts, 
particularly when they are for public purposes, are invalid and either 
operate not at all or only as powers.
B. Enforcement Problems for Charitable Purpose Trusts
Although the Crown can enforce charitable purpose trusts, it has been 
suggested that:
[i]t is probable that, without any previous complaint or critical information 
being brought to the Attorney General’s attention, the prerogative to investigate 
charities, if it exists, would not be exercised. And, even when the Attorney 
General does receive such a complaint or information, it is entirely within the 
135. In Re Lipinski’s, supra note 127 discussed above, Part III.C.2, the gift in 
question was upheld but the basis for enforcement was not clear. James 
Phillips notes in Phillips, supra note 21 that “commentators have had 
difficulty knowing how to characterize Lipinski” at 180. It has been 
said that Re Lipinski “confirmed in this particular sphere a continuing 
determination on the part of the judiciary not to allow the clear intentions 
of testators to be defeated” see Gravells, supra note 127 at 231.
136. A trust that, for example, provided for assisting immigrants in finding 
jobs and integrating into the society of the country they had migrated 
to might reduce tax dollars spent on supporting such persons and might 
lead to more tax revenues from immigrant employment income. A trust 
to provide for recreational facilities might reduce the expenditure of local 
taxpayer dollars on recreational facilities.
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attorney’s discretion whether the office should take any legal or other action. 137
Indeed, Canadian cases dealing with charitable purpose trusts 
rarely, if ever, arise in the context of a breach of trust action pursued by 
the Crown.138 While the CRA may also have a role with respect to the 
enforcement of charitable purpose trusts, its focus may not be entirely 
consistent with the interests of the persons who might benefit from 
pursuit of the purposes of a charitable purpose trust. If, for instance, 
charitable purpose trust funds are being used for charitable purposes but 
not for the particular charitable purposes the settlor clearly intended, 
the CRA, given that the funds are at least being used for some public 
benefit falling within the legal definition of charitable purpose, may not 
be particularly concerned, from the income tax perspective, that the 
funds are not being directed to the purpose the settlor intended. The 
CRA is unlikely to have the resources, and perhaps, from an income tax 
administration perspective, the incentive, to monitor charitable purpose 
trusts to assess whether they are devoting trust funds to their intended 
137. Waters, Gillen & Smith, supra note 6 at 835. See also the discussion of 
the lack of Crown enforcement of charitable purpose trusts in Chan, 
supra note 48 at 389-93. It is perhaps because, practically speaking, the 
enforcement of charitable purpose trusts is relatively weak that charities in 
Canada are typically organized as corporations. With a charity organized 
as a not-for-profit corporation the prospect of the corporation’s members 
enforcing the corporation’s charitable objects is likely greater than the 
prospect of Crown enforcement of charitable purposes of a charity 
organized as a trust.
138. While the author has not made a proper attempt to verify this empirically, 
a search through numerous (not all) Canadian cases involving an 
allegation of breach of trust did not yield a single case in which the Crown 
in right of a province (either through the Attorney General or nominee 
such as a Public Trustee or Public Trustee and Guardian) appeared as a 
party in the case name. The author also does not recall a single Canadian 
breach of trust case in which the Crown in right of a province pursued a 
breach of trust claim in respect of a charitable purpose trust. The assertion 
that Canadian cases dealing with charitable purpose trusts rarely, if ever, 
arise in the context of a breach of trust action pursued by the Crown 
appears to the author to be a reasonable one. See also the discussion in 
Chan, supra note 48 at 389-93.
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charitable purposes in an efficient manner. It is also doubtful whether the 
CRA has the statutory mandate to prevent a trustee from deviating from 
specific intended charitable purposes as long as the trustee is spending 
the funds for charitable purposes (or activities) or to deal with a trustee’s 
failure to expend the trust funds in an efficient manner.139
Charitable purpose trusts may, therefore, also operate with very 
limited enforcement. A trust draftsperson aware of this might consider 
advising the settlor of this problem and suggest as an alternative that the 
trust be reconceived as a trust for persons. This would at least provide 
beneficiaries who could enforce the trust instead of leaving enforcement 
to the Crown. If, however, the class of beneficiaries was quite large and if 
the trustee was given discretion over to whom distributions of income and 
capital were to go, it is likely none of the beneficiaries would have much 
of an incentive to enforce the trust and one might be no further ahead in 
terms of increasing the likelihood that the trust would be enforced.
C. Potential Enforcement Problems in Express Trusts 
for Persons
Weak enforcement may also arise with an express trust for persons. 
While the beneficiaries of express trusts are often individuals with a 
close relationship to the settlor, an express trust can, as noted in Part 
III.C.1 above, be a discretionary express trust with a broadly-defined, but 
conceptually certain, class of beneficiaries. The probability of the trustees 
exercising their discretion in favour of any particular persons within the 
class of beneficiaries may be low enough that none of the beneficiaries has 
139. The Income Tax Act, supra note 50, allows for a tax credit for donations 
to registered charities. A “registered charity” is a “charitable organization” 
that devotes its resources exclusively to charitable activities or a “charitable 
foundation” that distributes is funds to charitable organizations. See 
supra note 51. The Canada Revenue Agency could refuse registration or 
remove registration if these requirements were not met. While trustees 
of a charitable organization must devote the trust funds to charitable 
activities, the Income Tax Act does not specifically provide for action to be 
taken against trustees who fail to use trust funds for the specific purposes 
intended by the settlor or who fail to exercise a fiduciary duty of care in 
their use of trust funds for charitable purposes.
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much of an incentive to enforce the trust. Expressing it in the way it was 
expressed in Morice v The Bishop of Durham, there would be “[persons] 
in whose favour the court [could] decree performance”140 and, assuming 
requirements for a valid express trust were met (in addition to certainty 
of beneficiaries), the trust would be a valid trust, but the probability 
of enforcement would, nonetheless, be low. With no one likely to ever 
enforce the obligations the trustee has assented to, the court enforcement 
feature that arguably gives a trust its “legal” quality is, practically speaking, 
absent.
V. Expanding the Range of Persons Who Can 
Enforce Express Trusts
A. Proposed Enforcement of Certain Non-Charitable 
Purpose Trusts under Section 74 of the Uniform 
Trustee Act
The Uniform Trustee Act was the result of a project initiated by the Civil 
Section of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 2008.141 It is 
intended to be suitable for enactment across the country.142 Section 74 
of the Uniform Trustee Act would allow some non-charitable purpose 
trusts to operate as valid trusts and, unlike the non-charitable purpose 
trust provisions in perpetuities acts,143 would allow for the enforcement 
of trust duties instead of simply having the trust operate as a power.144 
Like the perpetuity act provisions, the trust would have to be one that 
“does not create an equitable interest in any person”145 and that is 
140. Supra note 12 at 658.
141. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Civil Section, Uniform Trustee 
Act: Final Report to the Working Group, (Whitehorse: 2012) at para 1.
142. Ibid.
143. The wait-and-see perpetuities legislation provisions are discussed in supra 
notes 34-36 and the accompanying text.
144. Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 74(10) allows a court to make an 
order it considers appropriate to enforce a non-charitable purpose trust. 
The comment on s 74 says that, “this section validates the creation of 
trusts for certain non-charitable public purposes”.
145. Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 74(2)(a).
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“sufficiently certain to allow the trust to be carried out”.146 The types of 
non-charitable purpose trusts that are made valid by section 74(3) are 
those that are “recognized by law as capable of being a valid object of a 
trust”,147 those with “purposes for which a society may be incorporated 
146. Ibid, s 74(3)(a). This appears to capture the essence of the “specific 
non-charitable purpose trust” language in the wait-and-see perpetuity 
legislation as it was interpreted in Re Russell, supra note 31. Uniform 
Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 74(3)(c) adds that the non-charitable purpose 
not be contrary to public policy.
147. These would presumably include the recognized exceptions of: (i) the 
erection of a monument at a gravesite; (ii) the maintenance of a gravesite; 
and (iii) the provision of food and shelter for specified animals. See the 
discussion supra notes 24-31 and the accompanying text. This is, indeed, 
what the commentary to Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 74 says. 
Would it, however, include non-charitable purpose trusts recognized on 
the basis suggested in Keewatin, supra note 31, that there are persons to 
whom the court could give standing to enforce the trust? 
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under the jurisdiction’s legislation respecting societies”,148 those for the 
performance of a function of government in Canada or those provided 
148. Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 74(3) is in italics and set out in 
square-brackets presumably as a suggested way to identify the “public 
purposes” the section is intended to validate (see the commentary to s 74). 
For provinces or territories with Acts styled “Societies Act” or “Society 
Act” see e.g. the Nova Scotia Societies Act, RSNS 1989, c 435; the British 
Columbia Society Act, RSBC 1996, c 433 soon to be replaced by the 
Societies Act SBC 2015, c 18; the Alberta Societies Act, RSA 2000, c S-14; 
the Yukon Societies Act, RSY 2002, c 206; and the Northwest Territories 
Societies Act, RSNWT 1988, c S-11. Not all provinces or territories 
have Acts styled “Societies Act” or “Society Act” but have instead Acts 
for “not-for-profit” or “non-profit” corporations – see e.g. the Ontario 
Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, SO 2010, c 15; and in Saskatchewan The 
Non-profit Corporations Act, 1995, SS 1995, c N-4.2. Some provinces 
provide for non-profit corporations in a statute that covers both for-profit 
and non-profit corporations – see e.g. for Manitoba The Corporations 
Act, CCSM c C225 [Manitoba Corporation Act]; and the Newfoundland 
Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36. British Columbia Societies Act, 
provides that: “a society may be formed under this Act for one or more 
purposes, including, without limitation, agricultural, artistic, benevolent, 
charitable, educational, environmental, patriotic, philanthropic, political, 
professional, recreational, religious, scientific or sporting purposes” at 
s 2(1). The Nova Scotia Societies Act provides that “[a] society may be 
incorporated under this Act to promote any benevolent, philanthropic, 
patriotic, religious, charitable, artistic, literary, educational, social, 
professional, recreational or sporting or any other useful object, but not 
for the purpose of carrying on any trade, industry or business” at s 3(1). 
In Prince Edward Island Part II of the Companies Act, c C-14 allows 
for the incorporation by letters patent of a body corporate “without 
share capital, for the purpose of carrying on in Prince Edward Island, 
without pecuniary gain to its members, objects of a patriotic, religious, 
philanthropic, charitable, scientific, artistic, social, professional or 
sporting character, or the like” at s 89. Similarly, the Manitoba Corporation 
Act provides that a corporation without share capital must “restrict its 
undertaking to one that is only of a patriotic, religious, philanthropic, 
charitable, educational, agricultural, scientific, literary, historical, artistic, 
social, professional, fraternal, sporting or athletic nature or the like” at  
s 267(1). 
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for by regulation.149 
Section 74(10) would allow a court to make an order it considers 
appropriate to enforce a non-charitable purpose trust or to enlarge, or 
otherwise vary, the powers of the trustee of a non-charitable purpose 
trust.150 Section 74(11) provides that: 
[a]n application for an order under this section may be made by any of the 
following:
(a) the Attorney General; 
(b) a person appointed specifically by the settlor in the trust 
instrument to enforce the trust; 
(c) the settlor; 
(d) the personal representative of the settlor; 
(e) the trustee; or 
(f ) a person appearing to the court to have a sufficient interest in 
the matter.
This list of persons who can seek a court order to enforce the non-
charitable purpose trusts made valid by section 74 addresses the main 
long-standing reason for the non-validity of non-charitable purpose 
trusts, namely, the lack of a beneficiary to enforce such trusts.
The provision in section 74(3)(c)(i) providing for the validity of a 
non-charitable purpose trust with a purpose for which a society may be 
incorporated is set out in italics and with square brackets perhaps because 
it is just a suggestion. It is a very broad suggestion that, given the breadth 
of societies legislation purpose provisions,151 might well include trusts 
149. Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, ss 74(3)(c)(iii) and (12). Each 
jurisdiction would provide its own regulations and could add to the list 
of purposes of non-charitable purpose trusts to which s 74 would apply. 
Section 74 would also apply to non-charitable purpose trusts created by a 
court making an order under s 75(3)(b), (d) or (f ) which gives the court 
certain powers to deal with mixed charitable and non-charitable purpose 
trusts.
150. Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, ss 74(5)-(10) set out court powers to 
make orders. Subsections 74(5)-(9) set out a somewhat modified version 
of court cy-près powers with respect to charitable purpose trusts. These 
cy-près powers are necessary because s 74(4) allows for the limited types of 
non-charitable purpose trusts made valid by s 74 to exist indefinitely.
151. See supra note 148 on the scope of societies’ legislation provisions on 
possible society purposes.
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that have little or no public quality. In that respect it may be too broad to 
the extent it might allow for enforcement of effectively private trusts by 
the Attorney General which would arguably not be a proper expenditure 
of taxpayer funds.
The Uniform Trustee Act effectively creates a fourth type of express 
trust since it provides in section 74 for the enforcement of trust duties for 
only certain types of non-charitable purpose trusts as described in section 
74(3), leaving the remaining non-charitable purpose trusts to be dealt 
with under section 76 in a manner similar to the non-charitable trust 
provision in wait-and-see perpetuities legislation. Section 76(2) provides 
that, 
If the terms of a disposition of property purport to create a trust that 
(a) does not create an equitable interest in any person, and 
(b) is for a specific non-charitable purpose, other than a non-
charitable purpose described under s. 74(3), 
the terms of the disposition must be construed, subject to this section, as 
constituting a power to appoint the income or the capital, as the case may be, 
for a period not exceeding 21 years.
Under the Uniform Trustee Act there would, therefore, be express trusts for 
persons, express trusts for non-charitable purposes that can be enforced 
under section 74, express trusts for specific non-charitable purposes 
that would, under section 76, operate as powers to appoint income or 
capital for the specific non-charitable purposes152 and express trusts for 
charitable purposes.
B. Allowing the Settlor to Add Trust Enforcers
The persons who can apply for a court order in the list in section 74 
that are of particular interest are: the settlor, the personal representative 
of the settlor or a person appointed specifically by the settlor. None of 
152. If the suggestion in Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 74(3)(c)(i) of 
allowing for purposes for which a society might be incorporated were 
followed there would seem to be relatively little room left for non-
charitable purpose trusts under s 76 given the scope of purposes for which 
a society may be incorporated. On the scope of purposes for which a 
society may be incorporated see supra note 148.
163(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
the persons in this list can apply to court to enforce an express trust for 
persons or a charitable purpose trust. It seems a curious result that the 
set of non-charitable purpose trusts made valid by section 74 would have 
access to a greater range of enforcement mechanisms than express trusts 
for persons or charitable purpose trusts. It might be said that the reason 
for the difference is that express trusts for persons and charitable purpose 
trusts have their own enforcement mechanisms — the beneficiaries 
for express trusts for persons and the Crown for charitable purpose 
trusts. Perhaps, however, it would make sense to expand the scope of 
enforcement mechanisms for express trusts for persons and for charitable 
purpose trusts, that could give the trusts draftsperson greater scope for 
creating an enforcement mechanism for the trust. Perhaps also a greater 
scope of enforcement mechanisms could be extended to non-charitable 
purpose trusts more generally and not just to those that are made valid 
by section 74.
The expanded scope of enforcement mechanisms for express trusts 
for persons and non-charitable purpose trusts not made valid by section 
74 should not include enforcement by the Attorney General for all 
such trusts since many such trusts are likely to have private objects.153 It 
arguably does not make sense to have the Attorney General, at taxpayer 
expense, enforce trusts created for the pursuit of private objects. Crown 
enforcement should, however, as discussed in Part VII below, extend not 
to just charitable purpose trusts but to non-charitable purpose trusts and 
express trusts for persons that provide sufficient public benefits to justify 
expenditure of taxpayer funds on enforcement.
1. Express Trusts for Persons
While the rights of beneficiaries to enforce express trusts for persons 
should remain, legislation might allow the settlor to indicate in the 
trust instrument that any one or more of the persons in (b) through (d) 
153. Also, as noted in notes 149-50 above and the accompanying text, a scope 
of non-charitable purpose trusts made valid by the Uniform Trustee Act, 
supra note 2, s 74 that includes any purpose for which a society may be 
incorporated is likely to be too broad since it may well include trusts that 
have little or no public benefit.
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of section 74(11) be given standing to enforce the trust (i.e. a person 
appointed specifically by the settlor in the trust instrument to enforce 
the trust, the settlor or the personal representative of the settlor). In the 
context of a discretionary express trust for persons with a broadly defined 
class of beneficiaries who might have little incentive to enforce the trust, 
legislative support for such a broader range of persons able to enforce the 
trust would allow the trust draftsperson (in consultation with the settlor) 
to consider and, if thought appropriate, allow for these additional means 
of enforcement. It might also be helpful to allow the trust draftsperson 
(in consultation with the settlor) to indicate in the trust instrument that 
any one or more of such persons be given standing to enforce the trust 
where it has unborn, minor or other incapacitated beneficiaries to better 
ensure enforcement on behalf of such beneficiaries.154
One problem with naming persons to enforce a trust is that they may 
have no more incentive to enforce the trust than the trustee has to carry 
out its terms. One might, therefore, ask: who monitors the enforcer? This 
may also be true of the personal representative of the settlor. Perhaps even 
the settlor will have little incentive to enforce once she or he has disposed 
of her or his interest in the trust property to the trustee. Why would the 
settlor not simply start by naming as trustee a person whom the settlor 
genuinely trusts to carry out the obligation regardless of whether there 
will ever be, for practical reasons, any enforcement of the legal obligation? 
There may, however, be situations where the person chosen as trustee has 
particular skills that will be beneficial in managing the trust. For instance, 
the trustee may have particular skills in investing trust funds and skills 
with respect to managing other trust assets or in the distribution of trust 
funds. The settlor may feel more comfortable with other persons seeing 
154. The person chosen by the settlor to enforce the trust might have a greater 
incentive to monitor the day-to-day operation of the trust than a public 
official who might be subject to many demands on limited resources. Even 
if the settlor appointed someone as enforcer, it might, nonetheless, be 
prudent, in the interests of protecting the minor, unborn or incapacitated 
beneficiary, to retain enforcement powers of a public official, such as a 
Public Trustee and Guardian, even where the settlor had appointed an 
enforcer (and even where the appointed enforcer refused to enforce the 
trust).
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to it that the chosen trustee, through the threat of enforcement, has an 
incentive carry out the trust obligations and do so in good faith and with 
care.
2. Charitable Purpose Trusts
Consideration should also be given to allowing settlors to name enforcers 
for the enforcement of charitable purpose trusts. This would allow them 
to provide for ongoing monitoring and enforcement of a charitable 
purpose trust that likely would be more effective than enforcement by 
the Crown. It would also allow for enforcement without expenditure of 
taxpayer funds.
3. Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
As noted above, section 74 of the Uniform Trustee Act only provided 
for the enforcement of trust duties for certain types of non-charitable 
purpose trusts, leaving other types of non-charitable purpose trusts to 
operate as powers pursuant to section 76. Legislative support might 
also be provided to allow these other non-charitable purpose trusts to 
be enforced not just as powers, but as trust duties by giving standing to 
enforce to persons the settlor appoints in the trust instrument to enforce 
the trust. This is an approach that was suggested by the Manitoba Law 
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Reform Commission in 1992.155 The persons entitled to enforce non-
charitable purpose trusts might also be extended to the settlor or the 
settlor’s personal representative. The trustee of a non-charitable purpose 
should also be given standing to apply to court to vary a non-charitable 
155. Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report on Non-Charitable Purpose 
Trusts, no 77 (1992). This Manitoba Law Reform Commission report also 
recommended that the enforcer be someone other than the trustee and 
that the enforcer be subject to the supervision of the court. Further, if no 
enforcer had been appointed, the trustee would have a duty to appoint 
one. It is interesting to compare the notion in Uniform Trustee Act, supra 
note 2, s 74(11)(b) of giving standing to a person appointed specifically 
by the settlor in the trust instrument to enforce the trust to opting instead 
to make a gift to a non-profit corporation (or society) with purposes set 
out in its constitution and a board of directors appointed by members 
of the corporation. The purposes might well be purposes similar to those 
in a non-charitable purpose trust (although they would have to fit the 
permitted purposes for a non-profit corporation). The board of directors 
might be seen as functionally equivalent to trustees of a purpose trust and 
the members who elect, or remove, members of the board of directors 
might be seen as an enforcement mechanism for seeing to it that the 
directors carry out the purposes of the corporation and do so efficaciously. 
With this comparison in mind, the linking of the limited set of non-
charitable purpose trusts made valid by s 74(3)(c)(i) of the Uniform 
Trustee Act, supra note 2, to the range of purposes set out in societies acts 
or their equivalents makes sense. Section 74 could, in this light, be seen 
as facilitating the use of an alternative organizational form, a trust, for the 
pursuit such purposes.
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purpose trust.156 
Allowing non-charitable purpose trusts to be enforced as trust duties, 
and not just as powers, gives greater scope to carrying out the intent of 
the settlor. It seems reasonable to carry out a settlor’s purpose trust intent 
if the trust intent is sufficiently clear to permit enforcement of the trust 
and the purpose is not illegal or contrary to public policy. The interest 
in carrying out the settlor’s intent would arguably be strengthened where 
the non-charitable purpose happens to be one that provides a benefit to 
a reasonably broad section of the community.
VI. Allowing Courts to Grant Standing to Persons to 
Enforce Express Trusts of Any Type
As noted in Part IV, enforcement can be weak for charitable purpose 
trusts and for discretionary express trusts for persons with large numbers 
of beneficiaries. Empowering the court to grant standing to persons to 
enforce not only non-charitable purpose trusts, but also charitable purpose 
trusts and express trusts for persons could facilitate the enforcement of 
156. In 1991 the British Columbia Law Reform Commission suggested in 
British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on Non-
Charitable Purpose Trusts, no 128 (1991) that standing to enforce non-
charitable purpose trusts be extended to a trustee [BC Working Paper]. 
Uniform Trustee Act s 74(11)(e) would also allow the trustee to enforce 
a non-charitable purpose trust. This would allow the trustee to apply 
pursuant to subsections 74(5)-(10) of the Uniform Trustee Act, supra 
note 2, to vary a non-charitable purpose trust where it is of a type made 
valid by s 74. A provision for the variation of a non-charitable purpose 
trust is necessary because a non-charitable purpose trust would not have 
identifiable beneficiaries and therefore could not be varied by invoking 
Saunders v Vautier (1841), 49 ER 282 (Ch) or under variations of trusts 
legislation. It would be particularly important to allow for the variation of 
non-charitable purpose trusts if the rule against perpetuities is abrogated 
as is proposed under s 88 of the Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, and 
as has occurred in in three provinces (for Manitoba see the Perpetuities 
and Accumulations Act, CCSM, c P33, ss 2-3 [Manitoba Perpetuities and 
Accumulations Act]; for Saskatchewan see The Trustee Act, 2009, SS 2009, 
c T-23.01, s 58 [Saskatchewan Trustee Act]; and for Nova Scotia see the 
Perpetuities Act, SNS 2011, c 42, ss 2-3 [Nova Scotia Perpetuities Act].
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such trusts when other means of enforcement are weak. 
Section 74(11) of the Uniform Trustee Act takes a similar approach 
by providing, in section 74(11)(f ), that an application may be brought 
by “a person appearing to the court to have a sufficient interest in the 
matter”.157 A similar provision could be enacted for express trusts for 
persons or charitable purposes allowing a person appearing to the court 
to have a sufficient interest in the matter to make such an application. 
Opening the scope for applications by anyone appearing to the 
court to have a sufficient interest in the matter might raise a concern 
for vexatious actions or actions not in the interests of the trust.158 This 
might be addressed by constraints similar to those used in corporate 
statutory derivative action provisions. For instance, one might require 
that the trustees be notified prior to the application to court for standing 
so the trustees have an opportunity to respond to alleged breaches and 
avoid potentially expensive litigation.159 One might also require that 
the applicant be acting in good faith and that the action appear to be 
in the best interests of the trust (i.e. in the interests of accomplishing 
the intent of the trust and in a cost-justified manner).160 Other features 
of the corporate statutory derivative action might also be borrowed. 
For instance, requiring court approval of settlements might discourage 
attempts by the applicant to pressure trustees into giving the applicant 
favourable treatment and for court orders giving directions with respect 
to the conduct of an action.161 Provisions relating to interim costs and 
157. The British Columbia Law Reform Commission in BC Working Paper, 
supra note 156, would also have allowed the court to grant standing to 
enforce a non-charitable purpose trust to “any person appearing to the 
Court to have a sufficient interest in the enforcement of the trust” at 33. 
158. For instance, actions that could significantly drain trust assets with little 
to be gained for the beneficiaries or purposes of the trust.
159. For a roughly corresponding corporate derivative action provision 
see Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 239(2)(a) 
[CBCA]. 
160. For roughly corresponding corporate derivative action requirements see 
CBCA, supra note 159, ss 239(2)(b), (c).
161. For related corporate derivative action provisions see CBCA, supra note 
159, ss 240(b) and 242(2).
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final cost awards might also be considered.162 
In keeping with the approach in Part V.B, above, of allowing settlors 
to add to the list of persons who can enforce a trust, one might allow 
settlors to decide whether the court should have a power to grant standing 
to persons to enforce the trust. This could be an opt-in approach where 
the statutory provision granting the court such a power would only 
operate if the settlor so indicated. It might instead be designed as an 
opt-out approach in which the settlor could indicate that the statutory 
provision granting the court a power to grant standing to persons (other 
than beneficiaries) was not to operate.
VII. Crown Enforcement of Specified Express Trusts
The Crown, as noted in Part II.C.1 above, has a prerogative power to 
enforce charitable purpose trusts. Trusts other than charitable purpose 
trusts, including both non-charitable purpose trusts and express trusts 
for persons, may, as noted in Part III.C above, have a public quality 
in some circumstances. That public quality may justify expenditure of 
Crown funds in the enforcement of such trusts. The Uniform Trustee Act 
appears to recognize this in the context of non-charitable purpose trusts 
since it proposes providing for potential Crown enforcement of certain 
specified non-charitable purpose trusts. Since it is possible for express 
trusts for persons to have a public quality, it arguably makes sense to 
extend Crown enforcement to express trusts for persons where they have 
a similarly sufficient public quality to justify the expenditure of public 
funds in enforcing such trusts. 
If the Uniform Trustee Act proposal for potential Crown enforcement 
of certain types of non-charitable purpose trusts is followed, there would 
be two bases for potential Crown enforcement of trusts. One would 
be the traditional enforcement of charitable purpose trusts said to be 
162. For corporate derivative action provisions see CBCA, supra note 159, 
ss 240(d), 242(3), 242(4). Section 240(d) allows the court to order the 
corporation to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the complainant (and 
here corporation might be replaced with payments out of trust funds). 
Section 242(3) concerns security for costs, and s 242(4) concerns interim 
costs.
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based on a Crown prerogative. The other would be potential Crown 
enforcement of non-charitable purpose trusts under a statutory authority. 
The justification for both forms of Crown enforcement is presumably the 
same — the presence of sufficient public interest in enforcement to make 
the potential expenditure of Crown funds on enforcement worthwhile. If 
the justification for the potential for Crown enforcement is the same for 
both charitable and non-charitable purpose trusts, then why should the 
basis of Crown enforcement be different? Grounding Crown enforcement 
on a statutory power makes Crown enforcement more directly part of 
the political process since elected representatives would have to turn 
their minds to appropriate circumstances for Crown enforcement and 
be responsible to the electorate for their decisions in that regard. It is, 
therefore, also recommended that the Crown prerogative to enforce 
charitable purpose trusts be replaced with a statutory authority. The 
statute would set out the types of trusts for which Crown enforcement 
would be available. The potential for Crown enforcement would then be 
based on a modern statute rather than the preamble to an English statute 
from over 400 years ago.163 In other words, the statutorily identified 
types of trusts for which there would be potential Crown enforcement 
would replace the current common law on what constitutes a charitable 
purpose. Potential for Crown enforcement would extend to all express 
trusts that were identified as having the requisite public quality to justify 
163. This approach is similar to the approach in the English Charities Act 2011, 
supra note 66. This act lists charitable purposes in ss 3(1)(a) to (l) that 
capture the main elements of the charitable purpose categories in Pemsel, 
supra note 14 and accompanying text, while adding several new charitable 
purposes. It therefore effectively adds to the list of the types of trusts that 
can be subject to Crown enforcement (although through the various 
mechanisms provided for in the Act). The English Charities Act 2011 
differs, however, from what is proposed here in that it would allow the 
Charity Commission or a court to add to the list of charitable purposes 
by including under “any other purpose … (ii) that may reasonably be 
regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, any purposes falling 
within any of paragraphs (a) to (l) … or (iii) that may reasonably be 
regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, any purposes which have 
been recognized, under the law relating to charities in England and Wales, 
as falling within sub-paragraph (ii) or this subparagraph” s 3(1)(m).
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Crown enforcement whether they were traditional charitable purpose 
trusts, non-charitable purpose trusts or express trusts for persons. 
One danger in trying to set out in statutory form all the types of 
trusts for which Crown enforcement is possible is that it might, perhaps 
through inadvertence, leave out many trusts that, as currently legally 
recognized charitable purpose trusts, have potential Crown enforcement. 
That problem might be addressed by grand-parenting in existing charitable 
purposes, but without a court power to add to these by reference to the 
preamble to the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses or analogies thereto.164 
Instead the court would be assessing whether the Crown could enforce 
a particular express trust and would do so through interpretation of a 
statute identifying the types of express trusts that could be enforced by 
the Crown.
A possible advantage to the existing common law approach to 
charitable purpose trusts is that it allows the law to move forward by 
gradually adding to valid charitable purposes by way of analogy and 
analogy upon analogy. A statutory approach might be too slow to respond 
to current societal needs. The statutory approach to Crown enforcement 
suggested above could, however, include additions to potential Crown 
enforcement by regulation allowing for a relatively quick response to 
societal need without having to get the question on the legislative agenda. 
The additions would then be part of a political process and would not 
be subject to constraints of a common law approach wedded to the 
preamble of a 400 year old statute. While the statute might list various 
purposes that would typically tend to have a public quality justifying 
Crown enforcement, it would likely also have to have a more general 
category that would be subject to incremental modifications through 
164. See e.g. English Charities Act 2011, supra note 66 which lists charitable 
purposes in s 3(1)(a) to (l) that, while capturing the main elements of the 
charitable purpose categories in Pemsel, supra note 14 and accompanying 
text, and while expanding on the scope of charitable purposes by adding 
several items, goes on to add, in s 3(1)(m), “any other purposes – (i) 
that are not within paragraphs (a) to (l) but are recognised as charitable 
purposes … under the old law”.
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court statutory interpretation.165
The statutory provisions identifying express trusts that could be 
enforced by the Crown would presumably have to address the question 
of public benefit since that is arguably the key to justifying Crown 
enforcement. While, for instance, a trust for the purpose of education 
normally would be inclined to have a public quality to it, it would 
presumably not be considered to have the requisite public quality for 
Crown enforcement if it was for exclusively for the education of the 
settlor’s children. Consideration should, however, be given to providing 
some statutory guidance on the meaning of public benefit.
In providing statutory authority for Crown enforcement of specified 
purpose trusts one might also revisit the question of how to make Crown 
enforcement more effective. In doing so one might consider various 
models currently used for the enforcement of charitable purpose trusts 
such as the Ontario Charities Accounting Act or the English Charities Act 
2011, discussed in Part II.C.1 above.166
VIII. Dispensing With the Distinctions Between 
Non-Charitable Purpose and Charitable Purpose 
Trusts (or Between Private Purpose Trusts and 
Statutorily Identified Public Purpose Trusts)
Once charitable and non-charitable purpose trusts are treated on the 
same basis with respect to Crown enforcement in the way described 
above, one might consider whether the distinction between these types 
of purpose trusts needs to be maintained. In addition to the issue of 
enforcement addressed by a Crown prerogative to enforce, charitable 
purpose trusts have a number of other distinct features such as the public 
benefit requirement, an exception with respect to the application of 
the rule against perpetuities, the exclusivity requirement, the political 
purposes doctrine and a qualification of the requirement of certainty of 
165. The listed purposes would also be subject to statutory interpretation, 
therefore, leaving some room for court modification over time.
166. See notes 60-75 and the accompanying text.
173(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
objects. This part addresses these distinct features of charitable purpose 
trusts arguing that once a common approach to enforcement of express 
trusts is provided for and if the historical concept of charitable purpose 
trusts is replaced with statutorily identified public benefit express trusts 
that can be enforced by the Crown, several distinct features of current 
charitable purpose trusts with respect to exclusivity, public benefit, the 
invalidity of political purpose trusts and possibly also perpetuity, need 
no longer be maintained. This part also notes implications for the Income 
Tax Act approach to registered charities if the traditional approach to 
charitable purpose trusts is replaced in the way recommended herein.
A. Exclusivity
The exclusivity requirement for charitable purpose trusts should be 
dispensed with even if the current approach to charitable versus non-
charitable purpose trusts remains. For similar reasons, the exclusivity 
requirement should be dispensed with if non-charitable purpose trusts 
are treated as valid trusts that impose trust obligations (not mere powers) 
on trustees. Also for similar reasons, the requirement should be dispensed 
with if the concept of charitable purpose trusts is replaced with broader 
statutorily identified public purpose trusts.
1. Dispensing with the Exclusivity Requirement
One might approach the exclusivity requirement for charitable purpose 
trusts from the standpoint of encouraging the creation of charitable 
purpose trusts on the assumption that it is desirable to encourage the 
creation of such trusts. In other words, one might ask what the effect 
would be on the creation of charitable purpose trusts if a settlor was 
allowed to mix charitable and non-charitable purposes and give the trustee 
an unfettered discretion to choose the extent of dispositions for either 
type of purpose. This is an empirical question that would be difficult 
to assess. However, there would be three possible outcomes. Dispensing 
with the exclusivity requirement could reduce the creation of charitable 
trusts, it could increase them or it could have no significant effect. 
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i. Reduction Unlikely
Is dispensing with the exclusivity requirement likely to reduce the 
creation of charitable purpose trusts? The only basis for such a reduction, 
it is submitted, is that if removal of the exclusivity requirement made 
enforcement of charitable purpose trusts by the Crown less effective, 
then settlors, knowing the prospect of enforcement is reduced, might be 
less inclined to create charitable purpose trusts. Crown enforcement of 
charitable purpose trusts in Canada appears, however, to be virtually non-
existent, so removal of an exclusivity requirement is likely to have little or 
no effect on the prospect of enforcement. It is unlikely that settlors, even 
if they knew about how charitable purpose trusts are enforced, would 
become less inclined to create charitable purpose trusts. 
Perhaps more robust Crown enforcement, together with an 
exclusivity requirement, would encourage greater allocations of property 
to charitable purpose trusts. The settlor, however, can achieve the effect of 
an exclusivity requirement simply by settling funds in trust on exclusively 
charitable purposes. The exclusivity requirement may, however, frustrate 
settlor intentions. Consider, for instance, the effect of the exclusivity 
rule under the current law with the distinction between charitable and 
non-charitable trusts and with an exclusivity requirement for charitable 
purpose trusts. A trust draftsperson might inform the settlor that a trust 
of mixed charitable and non-charitable purposes runs the risk that it will 
either be devoted exclusively to charitable purposes or held void with a 
resulting trust to the settlor (or her or his estate). The trust draftsperson 
might suggest creating two separate trusts, one for the charitable 
purposes and one for the non-charitable purposes. This, however, might 
not be entirely satisfactory for a settlor who wants to give the trustee the 
discretion to allocate funds between the settlor’s intended non-charitable 
and charitable purposes. The settlor might instead indicate that the 
funds should be directed exclusively to the non-charitable purposes. 
The trust draftsperson should then advise the settlor that such a trust 
would be invalid, or, in the Canadian wait-and-see perpetuity legislation 
jurisdictions, that while such a gift would be valid, it would operate only 
as a power and only for a maximum of twenty-one years. The settlor 
might respond by directing all the funds to the charitable purposes even 
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though that is not quite what the settlor wants and in this way perhaps 
the exclusivity requirement could lead to more funds being directed to 
charitable purpose trusts. The settlor may, however, conclude that the 
simplest thing to do is to just give everything to her or his children 
or other persons or not give at all. Either way it frustrates the settlor’s 
intention and it is hard to imagine that frustrating settlor intentions 
encourages more settling of property on charitable purpose trusts. 
ii. Increase or No Significant Effect
If dispensing with the exclusivity requirement would not reduce the 
creation of charitable purpose trusts, it leaves only the other two outcomes. 
Either dispensing with the exclusivity requirement increases the creation 
of charitable purpose trusts, which many would likely consider desirable, 
or it would have no significant effect in which case it would make sense 
to dispense with the exclusivity requirement and avoid the problems it 
can create.167 In the end, it is submitted, all an exclusivity requirement 
seems likely to do is frustrate settlors who would like to give trustees 
discretion to allocate funds between charitable and non-charitable 
purposes. Such frustration may cause some settlors to abandon some or 
all of their intended charitable and non-charitable purposes. Settlors who 
are unaware, or are not advised of, the pitfalls of mixed charitable and 
non-charitable purposes are likely to have their intentions defeated. 
2. Dispensing With an Exclusivity Requirement in a 
Regime of Private vs. Statutorily Identified Public 
Purpose Trusts 
If the charitable versus non-charitable purpose trust distinction was 
replaced by a distinction between statutorily identified public purpose 
trusts, as well as express trusts for persons, that could be enforced by 
the Crown and those that could not, the reason for an exclusivity rule 
would remain. In other words, the Crown arguably could not enforce 
public purpose trusts effectively if they were mixed with private purpose 
167. On the problems the exclusivity requirement can create see Part II.C.2 
above, notes 78-81 and the accompanying text.
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trusts and the trustee had the discretion to allocate trust funds among 
the various purposes. The trustee might simply point to his discretion 
to justify the expenditure of trust funds on private purposes to the 
exclusion of public purposes. If the settlor articulated purposes that were 
at least in part public purposes, then arguably there is a public interest 
in enforcement and the trustee should not be able to so easily avoid the 
expenditure of trust funds on public purposes by arguing that he has 
discretion to allocate funds between either the public or private purposes. 
The same arguments that apply to dispensing with the exclusivity 
requirement in the context of current charitable and non-charitable 
purpose trusts would, however, apply in the context of a regime that had 
enforceable private trusts for persons or purposes together with statutorily 
identified express trusts (whether for persons or purposes) enforceable by 
the Crown. Assuming it is considered desirable to encourage donations 
of funds on trusts that provide public benefits, what would be the 
effect of an exclusivity requirement on the creation of such trusts? It 
seems unlikely, for the reasons noted above with respect to charitable 
purpose trusts, that it would encourage the creation of such trusts. If it 
would discourage them, then presumably it makes sense not to have an 
exclusivity requirement. If the effect of an exclusivity requirement would 
be insignificant, then it would seem to make sense not to have such a 
requirement since it would invite the same difficulties currently created 
by the exclusivity requirement for charitable purpose trusts.
B. Public Benefit
While a court determination of public benefit, as discussed in Part VII 
above, would inevitably remain, it would be a public benefit assessment 
in the context of determining whether a particular express trust could be 
enforced by the Crown and this assessment would be the same whether 
the express trust was for persons or purposes. Whether the purpose was 
charitable or not would not be relevant in the context of interpreting the 
statute that identified trusts for which Crown enforcement was available. 
C. Political Purposes
The question of whether a trust for political purposes should be subject 
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to potential enforcement by the Crown should, it is submitted, be a 
question taken up in the legislative and political process of deciding 
whether the Crown should be given a statutory power to enforce such 
trusts. The question of whether “political purpose” trusts should be valid 
or not could then be subject to public debate. There arguably are public 
benefits to trusts for political purposes in a democratic society. This 
question should be confronted in the drafting of a statute that identifies 
the types of trusts for which Crown enforcement is available.168 Either 
the statute should permit Crown enforcement of such trusts or it should 
not. If the statute permitted Crown enforcement of political purpose 
trusts, the public benefit question that courts will inevitability have to 
assess should be addressed in the statute in a way that avoids having 
the court decide whether there is a benefit to advocating a change in 
the law. The statute might, for instance, deem there to be a benefit to 
political purpose trusts. The question for the court might then be limited 
to the question of whether there was a sufficient public quality to the 
trust in terms of the potential number of persons who might benefit.169 
The question being addressed by the statute and by a court interpreting 
the statute would not be whether the trust is valid or not but whether the 
trust could be enforced by the Crown.170
If it was decided through the political process, that political purpose 
trusts were to, by statutory enactment, be treated as valid trusts, it 
168. In other words, the current approach with respect to charitable purpose 
trusts mixes two questions together – one being the availability of Crown 
enforcement (currently tied up in the question of whether the purpose 
is charitable and provides a public benefit) and the question of whether 
trusts for political purposes should be allowed (that has become linked to 
the public benefit question).
169. A political purpose trust that advocated for a change to a law that, 
for example, benefited only the settlor or the settlor’s close relatives 
would arguably not have the requisite public quality to justify Crown 
enforcement.
170. The validity of the trust would be a separate question focusing on, for 
instance, the capacity of the settlor to create the trust, the three certainties, 
the constitution of the trust, its compliance with any necessary formalities 
such as under wills legislation or statute of frauds legislation, and whether 
the purported trust was illegal or contrary to public policy. 
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would be important to address the mechanism for Crown enforcement. 
Enforcement through an Attorney General who is a member of cabinet 
would arguably be less than ideal since the Attorney General may be 
reluctant to enforce political purpose trusts that were against the 
interests of the government. It may, therefore, be important to create a 
Crown enforcement body that operates reasonably independently from 
government.
D. Perpetuity Exception
1. Abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Another distinction between charitable purpose trusts and non-
charitable purpose trusts is that charitable purpose trusts, subject to 
limited exceptions, can be of perpetual duration. Obsolete uses of trust 
property can be dealt with through court cy-près orders. There is a move 
to abrogation of rules against perpetuities with Manitoba, Saskatchewan 
and Nova Scotia having all abrogated them in recent years.171 The Uniform 
Law Conference of Canada has recommended similar abrogation in 
other Canadian common law jurisdictions.172 If rules against perpetuities 
are abrogated, it would remove the perpetuity distinction between non-
charitable purpose trusts and charitable purpose trusts. If non-charitable 
purpose trusts were treated as valid trusts and the rule against perpetuities 
were abrogated it would leave the potential for obsolete non-charitable 
purpose trusts and some means to vary such trusts would be needed. Cy-
près might be extended to non-charitable purpose trusts, but it might be 
better to reassess the variation of express trusts more generally addressing 
not only the question of varying non-charitable purpose trusts, but also 
addressing issues in varying charitable purpose trusts and express trusts 
171. For Manitoba see the Manitoba Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, supra 
note 156, ss 2-3; for Saskatchewan see the Saskatchewan Trustee Act, supra 
note 156, s 58; and for Nova Scotia see the Nova Scotia Perpetuities Act, 
supra note 156, ss 2-3.
172. Currently expressed in Uniform Trustee Act, supra note 2, s 88.
179(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
for persons.173
The same considerations would apply if the charitable versus non-
charitable purpose trust distinction was replaced with a distinction 
between private purpose trusts and statutorily identified public purpose 
trusts and purpose trusts were generally made enforceable. Removal of the 
rule against perpetuities would make distinguishing between such public 
and private purpose trusts on the basis of a rule against perpetuities no 
longer necessary. There would, however, be a need for a means to vary 
such trusts if, over time, it became impossible or impracticable to execute 
them.
2. Retention of the Rule Against Perpetuities
If the rule against perpetuities or some alternative rule of similar purpose 
was to be retained, one would need to consider whether a distinction 
should be made in the application of the rule to valid private purpose 
trusts and statutorily identified public purpose trusts. If private purpose 
trusts were treated as valid trusts or were even just enforced as powers, 
concerns about dead hand control of funds through private purpose 
trusts (or powers) might remain and some means of bringing an end to 
such trusts (or powers) might be considered necessary.
E. Certainty of Objects for Charitable Purpose Trusts
Certainty of objects is one of the three certainties required for the 
creation of an express trust. For an express trust for persons the objects 
are the persons who are to be the beneficiaries of the trust and the 
certainty required is certainty of beneficiaries. For a purpose trust the 
objects are the purposes of the trust and the certainty required is certainty 
of purposes. A qualification with respect to certainty of purposes is 
made for charitable purpose trusts. The certainty need only be that the 
settlor intended the trust property to be held for charitable purposes. If, 
however, the particular charitable purposes are not clearly expressed, the 
173. Nova Scotia has taken a different approach to variation of trusts than 
other jurisdictions. See the Nova Scotia Variation of Trusts Act, RSNS 
1989, c 486, as amended by SNS 2011, c 42, s 6.
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court can provide a scheme giving the trustee some clarity as to how the 
trust should be administered. In a testamentary trust, subject to concerns 
for dependent relief, it arguably makes sense to treat a clearly expressed 
charitable intent, even though the charitable purposes themselves are 
vague, as a valid charitable purpose trust to avoid the return of the trust 
property to the estate and, therefore, to residuary legatees or intestate heirs 
(giving them a windfall gain) contrary to the clearly expressed charitable 
intent of the testator and taking into account the public benefit quality 
of charitable purposes.
It seems desirable to retain this particular aspect of the exceptional 
treatment of charitable purpose trusts. One might, however, ask whether 
this same treatment should be extended to other purpose trusts. If, for 
instance, a testator put aside property to be held on trust for “benevolent 
or philanthropic purposes” without further elaboration, would it not 
also be reasonable to allow the trust to take effect with the court setting 
out a scheme for the “benevolent or philanthropic” purposes rather than 
having the property revert to the estate to be distributed to the residuary 
legatees or intestate heirs (subject, perhaps, to concerns for the needs 
of dependents). Returning the property to the estate to be distributed 
to residuary legatees or intestate heirs would be contrary to the clearly 
expressed benevolent or philanthropic intentions of the testator and 
the property intended by the settlor to be used for “benevolent or 
philanthropic” purposes could, in accordance with those words, be 
directed to purposes that could provide a public benefit (unless some 
other language in the will constrained the scope of persons whom the 
testator intended to benefit). Such an approach, in addition to providing 
a public benefit, would arguably be more consistent with the settlor’s 
intent.
If property is settled on trust for vaguely expressed private purposes, 
the question would be more difficult. One would be faced with the issue 
of either finding the trust invalid and having the property revert to the 
estate, and therefore to persons the settlor apparently did not intend the 
property to go to, or trying to provide the trustee with some direction as 
to the purposes to which the property should be directed knowing that 
whatever purpose the property was directed to, given the settlor’s vague 
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expression of purposes, probably also did not fit the intent of the settlor. 
There would likely be some purpose trusts that would be close to the 
line in terms of falling within the statutorily identified public purposes 
and for these a possible resolution might be to conclude they do fall 
within the statutorily identified public purposes and therefore apply the 
approach suggested above and provide a public purpose scheme for the 
use of the property. Where the property is clearly directed to purposes 
outside the statutorily identified public purposes, it would appear to 
leave a choice between two outcomes neither of which satisfies the intent 
of the settlor (whatever that might have been). A rule that returns the 
property to the settlor might give the settlor, hopefully assisted by a 
knowledgeable draftsperson, an incentive to spell out the purposes in 
sufficient detail, such that the trustee, and a court, has a clear enough 
indication of the settlor’s intent. Perhaps an alternative would be to give 
the intended trustee a power to use or appoint the property for purposes 
or persons (other than the trustee) for a statutorily set period of time.
F. Effect on the Income Tax Act Approach to Registered 
Charities 
If Canadian provincial legislative provisions were to do away with the 
distinction between charitable and non-charitable purpose trusts, how 
would it affect the tax subsidy provisions under the Income Tax Act? 
In interpreting the meaning of “charitable purposes” and “charitable 
activities” courts in Canada have made reference to the meaning of 
“charitable purposes” in the common law of trusts. Courts interpreting 
those Income Tax Act provisions could continue to do so even though the 
continued development of that expression would no longer be developed 
by Canadian common law in the context of trust law. The development 
of the meaning of that expression has, for some years now, largely been 
done by courts interpreting provisions in the Income Tax Act. Perhaps 
Parliament might then be inclined to give a renewed focus to identifying 
the types of purposes and activities for which donation tax credits should 
be provided. One might lament the absence of the contribution trust law 
court decisions might make to the meaning of charitable purposes under 
the Income Tax Act if the traditional approach to charitable purpose trusts 
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was no longer retained. The loss of such contributions might not, however, 
be that significant given the relative paucity of such cases. Further, one 
might question the benefit to be obtained from trust law decisions on the 
meaning of charitable purposes where the policy considerations are quite 
different from those at play in the context of providing an income tax 
credit that can lead to a potentially significant reduction in government 
tax revenues.
IX. Conclusion
Trust enforcement problems are not limited to problems arising from the 
absence of named beneficiaries, or a clearly described class of beneficiaries, 
in non-charitable purpose trusts. Enforcement of trusts will rarely, if ever, 
be perfect and the effectiveness of enforcement for any given trust will 
always be question of degree. While charitable purpose trusts are valid in 
spite of the absence of named beneficiaries or a clearly described class of 
beneficiaries on the basis of enforcement by the Crown as parens patriae, 
there will be gaps in enforcement, particularly in Canada where, with 
some qualification in the province of Ontario, there is no scheme for 
enforcement such as the English Charity Commission. Enforcement of 
express trusts for persons can also be weak, particularly in the context of 
discretionary trusts with a large number of beneficiaries. 
While charitable purpose trusts are sometimes described as “public 
trusts,” express trusts for persons and non-charitable purpose trusts can 
provide benefits for a broad community extending well beyond the 
settlor’s family and personal friends. Express trusts for persons and non-
charitable purpose trusts may well, in fact, provide benefits to a much 
broader range of persons than many charitable purpose trusts. Facilitating 
enforcement of all types of express trusts would, therefore, likely be 
conducive to encouraging philanthropy and ensuring the philanthropic 
use of funds directed to philanthropic purposes. 
With provinces perhaps poised to enact the Uniform Trustee Act 
proposed by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada Law, it seems 
an appropriate time to consider extending aspects of enforcement for 
non-charitable purpose trusts, charitable purpose trusts and express 
trusts for persons. Enforcement could be facilitated by providing for the 
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enforcement of non-charitable purpose trusts by appointed enforcers that 
might include the settlor or the settlor’s personal representatives. That 
same approach to enforcement could also allow for stronger enforcement 
of express trusts for persons, particularly where those express trusts 
for persons are discretionary trusts with a broad range of beneficiaries. 
Enforcement of all types of express trusts might also be expanded by 
allowing the court to grant standing to persons (other than named 
beneficiaries or the Crown) to enforce express trusts, perhaps with the 
settlor being allowed to opt in or out of granting the court such a power. 
With a workable means of enforcement, non-charitable purpose 
trusts could be treated as legally valid so that the trust purposes become 
trustee duties and not just powers in the manner provided for in wait-
and-see perpetuity legislation. Once non-charitable purpose trusts are 
treated as legally valid trusts there would arguably be no further need, 
at least from the standpoint of legal validity, to distinguish between 
charitable and non-charitable purpose trusts. While the distinction might 
be retained with respect to the question of whether the Crown (through 
the Attorney General or other nominee such as a Public Trustee) has 
standing to enforce the trust, this might be treated as a separate question 
with legislation describing the types of purpose trusts with respect to 
which the Crown would be given standing to enforce thereby making 
the question of Crown enforcement more directly a part of the political 
process. 
If a statutory approach to Crown enforcement is taken, the question 
of public benefit can become part of the political process with the public 
benefit then presumed if the particular purpose falls within the statutorily 
identified purposes for which Crown enforcement is permitted. If public 
benefit was presumed for the statutory identified trusts for which Crown 
enforcement is permitted, the alleged problem that led to the invalidity 
of political purpose trusts is arguably no longer present. The validity of 
political purpose trusts might then be addressed as a question for the 
legislature and therefore more directly a part of the political process. If, as 
a result of such a political process, it is decided that political purpose trusts 
are to be treated as valid trusts, legislation might address as a separate 
question whether such trusts should be enforceable by the Crown. Cy-
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près, or some modified version of it, could be extended to non-charitable 
purpose trusts made valid by providing for their enforcement as trusts. 
One might also extend the provision of administrative schemes for 
uncertain purposes beyond charitable purposes to the purposes statutorily 
deemed to be public purposes. 
The exclusivity requirement should be dispensed with regardless of 
whether any other changes are made concerning the validity of non-
charitable purpose trusts or expanding the range of means of enforcement 
for express trusts generally. The exclusivity requirement is not likely to 
have the effect of increasing the creation of charitable (or statutorily 
identified public) purpose trusts. It either discourages the creation of 
such trusts which would favour dispensing with it or it has no significant 
effect on the creation of such trusts in which case dispensing with it 
would avoid problems associated with it. 
